Archive

Archive for January, 1986

They lie in wait to deceive: “a study of anti-Mormon deception”

January 1st, 1986 No comments
Number of Views: 30

Brown, Robert L. 1986. They lie in wait to deceive: “a study of anti-Mormon deception”. Rev. ed. Brownsworth Pub. Co.

Rating:
1

Summary:
The primary focus of the book is to illustrate that Dee Jay Nelson, a Mormon critic and self-claimed expert egyptologist, does not actually have the credentials he claims. The book also intends to assassinate Dee Jay Nelson’s character by depicting him as a blatant liar and fraud. Finally, the book makes a feeble attempt to argue that Mr. Nelson’s claims concerning the authenticity of The Book of Abraham, a piece of canonical Mormon scripture, are not accurate.

To accomplish these aims, the authors go to some length to research Mr. Nelson’s background and credentials, digging up information on his claimed degrees and other alleged “academic” accomplishments. The authors also communicate with reputable egyptologists at universities and research institutions around the world with the intent of situating Mr. Nelson in the world of egyptologists.

The authors ultimately conclude, quite rightly given the evidence they present, that Dee Jay Nelson is a fraud with no academic credentials and, at best, an amateur understand of both the Egyptian language and Egyptian history and culture. All of his “degrees” came from a diploma mill that had since been shut down. Nelson’s claims about publications were lies; he had published one book on the power of Egyptian pyramids that was not remotely “scientific”.

As far as the authors’ claims about the authenticity of The Book of Abraham go, well, let’s just say they almost begin to sound like Mr. Nelson… they certainly aren’t forthright and objective in their approach. But more on this below.

Review:
misses the point, but defrauds a charlatan

As I note in my comments above, it is quite clear that Mr. Nelson is a fraud. I certainly won’t argue that point and, in fact, I think that is the one useful contribution this book makes. I applaud the Browns for their work in this regard; frauds like Mr. Nelson deserve to be rooted out and skewered.

That said, this book is riddled with problems; so many problems, in fact, that I’m not really sure where to begin. Some general issues with the book are worth noting. It isn’t well-organized. It jumps around a lot and is poorly written. But the biggest ‘stylistic’ issue is that the authors re-hash the same point over and over again – Nelson doesn’t have the credentials he claims he does. They must say this some four or five hundred times. The time it takes to repeat this point would have been better spent addressing some of the concerns I outline below.

One of the most important problem with this book involves the goal of the authors in attacking Mr. Nelson. While I have conceded the point that Mr. Nelson is a fraud, this does not get to the root of the matter: The Book of Abraham is also a fraud and that is what Mr. Nelson was claiming. If the authors assume that destroying the credibility of Mr. Nelson will also destroy criticism of The Book of Abraham, they are sorely mistaken and, in fact, committing a logical fallacy: attacking the person (though, in this case, there is reason to question Mr. Nelson’s ‘claim to authority’, which was also a fallacy). Just because one critic is a fraud and lacks the credentials to illustrate that The Book of Abraham is a fraud, that does not mean the arguments the critic made are false. If you do bother to read this book, you will quickly note that the claims made by Mr. Nelson are rarely treated on their own merits. The authors seem to believe that if the critic is a fraud that is sufficient evidence to indicate none of his arguments are worthwhile (see p. 133). Unfortunately for the authors, that is simply not true.

It is also worth nothing that several of the authors’ attempts to illustrate that Nelson is a fraud fall quite short of the mark. For instance, in discussing Nelson’s translation of the papyrii in chapter four, the authors use one reference from one individual who calls it “amateur”. They fail to actually illustrate how it is an amateur translation. If they really wanted to ‘debunk’ Nelson’s translation they would reproduce it alongside other translations so readers could see just how ‘amateur’ it is. In chapter five the authors claim that Dee Jay Nelson does not know French but only present as evidence for their claim that he never took a course in French. If I’m not mistaken, taking a course in French isn’t the only way to learn French. This isn’t a reasonable argument against Nelson’s claim. Without clear evidence that he can’t speak French – for example, a speaking test – the authors really shouldn’t make this claim. The authors later claim in the same chapter that in order to speak multiple languages you have to be an educated man. Logic doesn’t side with the authors on this one. Also in chapter five the authors speak in definitives about the non-existence of Reed J. Neuberger, a person involved in the publication of Nelson’s book. I think they present evidence to indicate he might not exist, but they certainly don’t prove it with certainty. A simple and more compelling alternate explanation might be that Mr. Neuberger lives somewhere other than Billings and wrote the letter while visiting Mr. Nelson. That seems plausible to me. To claim that someone does not exist because he isn’t listed in one phone book in one city is pretty silly. I’m not listed in the Billings, Montana phone book; does that mean I don’t exist? And, even if Mr. Neuberger doesn’t exist, what does that prove? Nothing. Finally, the authors use one source, a Dr. El Zeini – who is somewhat partial to Mormonism – to debunk all of Nelson’s claims about working with Farouk. I’m inclined to believe Dr. El Zeini, but I would prefer multiple sources. Thus, while I don’t question the authors evidence when it comes to Mr. Nelson’s academic credentials, some of the authors’ other claims are not entirely credible.

The authors are also not above belittling Mr. Nelson. Most of the chapters begin with comics mocking him and they periodically level ad-hominem attacks at his character. Personal attacks on an individual, regardless of his/her claims, are not appropriate.

The authors also make some clearly unfounded, blanket statements and claims. For instance, on p. iv the authors say, “With anti-Mormon speakers, he [Nelson] very quickly became the No. 1 authority on the Book of Abraham, and his denunciation of the book is extensively quoted in nearly all anti-Mormon books.” While there may be some merit to this claim, the authors don’t actually provide evidence to illustrate this is true. Where are their references? For some reason the authors require evidence from Mr. Nelson but don’t hold themselves to the same standards. Another instance of a broad, unfounded statement is found on p. vii, “Concerned Christians is a non-profit organization, with members from various denominations (always headed by apostate Mormons) who claim they are reaching out in love to those lost in Mormonism.” Again, a simple list of past leaders of the organization and their dates of affiliation with the Mormon Church would be sufficient evidence to confirm this statement. Such a list is not provided. Additionally, some quote from the mission statement of the Concerned Christians would bolster the authors’ description of the organization. Finally, the authors claim on p. 116 that, “The Church of Jesus Christ of Latter-day Saints is the fastest growing church in America today. It has certainly done well without Nelson’s help.” When the authors made that statement (early 1980s), it wasn’t true, and it isn’t true today (see http://www.adherents.com/rel_USA.html#families).

Perhaps the most significant problem with this book, however, is the authors’ failure to present a compelling case for the authenticity of The Book of Abraham. This point warrants discussion at length. The authors of this book claim that The Book of Abraham is not a fraud and employ some ridiculous gymnastics in the defense of their position (see pp. iv and v). Their basic argument, originally proposed by Hugh Nibley (the famed Mormon liar/apologist) among his possible explanations for why The Book of Abraham wasn’t found on the papyrii when it should have been, goes like this: There could have been additional pieces of papyrus that were actually lost in the Chicago fire, and The Book of Abraham was on one of those pieces of papyrus; since the source documents are gone, we can’t know if Joseph Smith made an accurate translation. This is a particularly convenient position to take as it makes the argument for the authenticity of The Book of Abraham non-falsifiable, just like Joseph Smith’s translation of The Book of Mormon, because the source documents are claimed not to exist. The authors make this claim – that the papyrus for The Book of Abraham does not exist – explicitly at least twice (see pp. 110 and 193). What the authors fail to discuss is the fact that actual experts – including the main authority appealed to throughout the book, Klaus Baer (Hugh Nibley’s teacher in Egyptian) – have explicitly stated that the existing papyrii are the ones used in Joseph Smith’s “translation”. Klaus Baer has clearly laid out his opinion on The Book of Abraham (see Dialogue, Vol.3, No.3). He points out on p.111 of his translation and commentary on The Book of Abraham that Joseph Smith believed the papyrus that contains The Breathing Permit of Hor was The Book of Abraham. It obviously was not; IT IS THE BREATHING PERMIT OF HOR! Other authors (see Ashment, Edward H. Reducing Dissonance: The Book of Abraham as a Case Study. In The Word of God. Dan Vogel, Editor) agree – The Book of Abraham is the clearest example of Joseph Smith’s ability to convince people he could translate ancient languages while not being able to actually do so. There really is no reason to question this point anymore – he could not translate ancient texts.

One of the few claims made by Mr. Nelson that the authors attempt to refute (his assignment of names to characters in a papyrus) ultimately turns into one of the most ridiculous mix of half-truths and convolutions I have ever read. On p. 156 the authors claim that Joseph Smith’s assignment of names to characters on the papyrii are something other than what Joseph actually said they were. Joseph Smith claimed that one figure’s name was ‘Elkenah’; actual egypologists said it’s name was ‘Duamutef’. The same holds true for all of the other names Joseph Smith came up with for characters in the papyrii; he missed them all by a mile. But somehow, using the most tortured logic I’ve ever seen, the authors actually try to claim that ‘Elkenah’ equals ‘Duamutef’. Am I missing something here? I mean, is there anyway short of irrationality (and prayer, see below) to reconcile this blatant disregard for reason? In what universe do these two things equate? And to miss all four of the names of the represented gods… that doesn’t show a minor error due to haste or mistranslation. It shows that Joseph Smith didn’t have a clue what the papyrii actually said. Astonishingly, the authors of this book actually twist things around to claim Joseph knew Egyptian better than modern egyptologists. The authors proceed to use an identification in one papyrus to claim an interpretation in another papyrus is similar to something one egyptologist said, despite substantial evidence to the contrary (this is in reference to characters representing directions). If this isn’t picking, choosing, and convoluting the facts, I don’t know what is. The authors are just about as guilty as is Mr. Nelson when it comes to presenting false and misleading information.

One last major point about the book involves the authors’ perspective on scholarship. Repeatedly, the authors rely upon the academic credentials of recognized experts in the field of Egyptology to illustrate that Dee Jay Nelson isn’t an expert. However, when it comes to actually exploring The Book of Abraham, the authors turn their backs on the experts and instead turn to prayer. Repeatedly, the authors claim that the only way of determining the truth is through prayer (see pp. i, 156, and 134). In fact, they go so far as to claim that facts are less important than prayer in determining truth (see p. 155). If prayer is more important than facts, then the authors will appreciate that I prayed to the squirrel outside my window and it told me the authors of this book, Robert and Rosemary Brown, are purple martians with bloated egos. I determined this “truth” through prayer, therefore it must be the truth, facts aside. The point here, of course, is that prayer is about as useful as picking your nose when it comes to digging for truth. Turning to prayer as the ultimate authority undermines all of the factual evidence the authors build up and their reliance on scientists. I could, according to their perspective, pray about the truthfulness of their book and my squirrel/god could tell me it was false. By their standard, this outweighs the effort they have put into their book. The reason I highlight this problem is because the authors rely heavily upon Klaus Baer (and other experts) when it suits their purposes but turn their backs on him when he clearly illustrates that The Book of Abraham is a fraud. What’s more, the authors actually claim that, “If Nelson would seek guidance from the Holy Ghost, he would know the truth of these things” (p. 134) in reference to knowing that Joseph Smith was a prophet and could actually translate Egyptian. Again, applying this standard universally, I would have to ask if this standard applies to non-Mormon Klaus Baer too? Should Klaus simply disregard his years of education and instead turn to the squirrel outside his window for translations? I get the distinct impression in reading this book that not only do the authors have multiple standards, which contradict each other, but they also only seem to trust only Mormons (as noted by the fact that their references to commentary on The Book of Abraham are only to faithful Mormons). If the authors of this book value legitimate doctoral degrees and educations from accredited institutions, why don’t they give credence to the findings of respectable professionals with such degrees?

In conclusion, this book is useful in that it clearly illustrates Dee Jay Nelson is a fraud without the proper credentials to comment on The Book of Abraham. But that is the only thing the book gets right. Employing a combination of insults, mockery, and logical fallacies, the authors conveniently overlook the real issue – the legitimacy of The Book of Abraham. Scholars without pre-conceived judgments on The Book of Abraham – those employing science rather than emotion-based religious conviction – have universally concluded Joseph Smith was no expert on Egyptian. Joseph Smith clearly did not have a clue how to translate the papyrii. This book is a great example of how apologists attempt to skirt real issues by focusing on side issues. Whether or not Dee Jay Nelson is a legitimate scholar is wholly tangential to the real issue; the authors know that, but, lacking evidence and facts and armed solely with prayer, their only hope to maintain their testimonies is to avoid the real issue. You’re welcome to read the book for yourself (it’s available for free online here: , but you would be much better off reading Klaus Baer’s discussion of the papyrii in Dialogue (reference above). It addresses the real issue and is written by a true expert.

How to Be Your Own Best Friend

January 1st, 1986 No comments
Number of Views: 27

Newman, Mildred, Bernard Berkowitz, and Jean Owen. 1986. How to Be Your Own Best Friend. Ballantine Books.

Rating:
6

Review:
This is another self-help book that I received from my wife’s grandmother’s library when she passed away. The book is thin and fairly small, making it a short read (about 40 minutes total). It is set up as a dialogue between a psychotherapist and a patient or perhaps journalist. Before I go any further I should mention that I read the 1971 version rather than the 1990 version, so obviously things are going to be a bit different. With that in mind, the criticisms I have about the book may no longer apply.

First, the criticism…

This book was written during the time period in which the American Psychological Association still recognized homosexuality as a disorder. In this edition of the book it is seen as such and used as an example of people that can change if they really want to. I’m assuming that homosexuality isn’t seen as a disorder in the newer editions, but, you’ll just have to read it to find out I guess.

The second criticism was the format of the book. Though I recognize it as a tactical device to sell you on the philosophy of the book, the dialogue between the patient/journalist and the psychotherapist is a bit too contrived to be of any real use. The questions asked are very leading and leading in a direction that is always favorable to the answer the psychotherapist has. At the end of the book the questioner admits that they are ‘convinced’ of the correctness of the philosophy of the book. Please. That kind of stuff never happens in psychotherapy, but it is a good sales tactic – we convinced this person in the book, we should be able to convince you. To make it an even better sales tactic they should have the questioner in the book be a nameless business-world kingpin, or Larry King, or some other hard-nosed reporter, someone that the reader of the book can identify as being very astute and not easily persuaded (not that any of the examples I gave necessarily are). That would work even better.

Third criticism, some times the information is presented as though there is some state of happiness that can be attained. Now, call me cynical, but I don’t know that I buy into the ‘state of happiness’ theory anymore. I used to think that people could ‘arrive at’ a state of happiness, but I’m just not that sure anymore. However, this review isn’t supposed to be a place where I propose my own theories, so I’ll just have to write my own book on that topic I guess.

Last criticism. As psychotherapists the authors should know that they can’t solve people’s problems by having them read books. Psychotherapy involves a lot more than that (I’m not an expert, but a degree in psychology and a year working in a mental institution should be worth something).

Now that I have offered my criticisms, I must admit that the book is very insightful. It is traditional psychotherapy to the fullest extent. There is a lot of talk about exploring childhood problems and overcoming the damage that they did to you. The discussion is very persuasive at times and I found a lot of the advice to be very insightful. Like I said before, I read the 1971 edition so things may have changed quite a bit, but I’ll give you some of the quotes I really liked anyway…

Q. Accept the messiness and the mistakes? But I thought the point was to stop making them.
A. If you do, you’ll be the only one. (p. 83)

Q. But what if you can’t manage everything you’d like to do – few of us can – and you have to make choices? When does doing good things for yourself become pure self-indulgence?
A. Doing what makes you feel good about yourself is really the opposite of self-indulgence… It does mean being self-centered enough to care for yourself and to take care of yourself. If you don’t learn how to do that, you can never care properly for others. (p. 35)

Overall, there are a lot of great insights in this book. The reason I rate is as low as I do is because of a fundamental disagreement about happiness and also because of the manipulative format (I’m assuming their views on homosexuality have changed, if not, then it should get a zero). Perhaps things have changed in later editions. If so, great for the authors and I hope someone posts a response to this review letting me know that.

Categories: book reviews Tags:

Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity

January 1st, 1986 No comments
Number of Views: 71

Goffman, Erving. 1986. Stigma: Notes on the Management of Spoiled Identity. Touchstone.

Rating:
8

Summary:
Insightful, but not particularly groundbreaking

The book is basically an application of Meadian Symbolic Interactionism to the phenomenon of stigma. Stigma are defined by Goffman as, “…the situation of the individual who is disqualified from full social acceptance” (preface).

The basic point made is that stigma are not physical attributes or characteristics but social ones, “…stigma involves not so much a set of concrete individuals who can be separated into two piles, the stigmatized and the normal, as a pervasive two-role social process in which every individual participates in both roles, at least in some connections and in some phases of life. The normal and the stigmatized are not persons but rather perspectives. These are generated in social situations during mixed contacts by virtue of the unrealized norms that are likely to play upon the encounter” (pp. 137-138).

An additional point made by Goffman surrounds the adoption of a stigmatized personality. Goffman argues that there are two phases in the learning process of stigmatized individuals: (1) learning the normal point of view and that he/she is disqualified from it; (2) learning to pass or get along in society in such a fashion that he/she either entirely conceals the stigmatic characteristic or minimizes it to alleviate the discomfort it brings to all involved parties (both normal and stigmatized) in social situations (see quote from p. 80).

Goffman follows this point with the argument that ‘normals’ really do not understand the plight of the stigmatized, primarily because they place stigmatized individuals into a bind: they force them to recognize their difference yet expect them to act as though it does not exist, should not exist, and/or can be ignored. The result is nothing short of cognitive dissonance for the stigmatized individual – they can’t deny they belong to the ‘stigmatized’ group, yet they are forced to try to conform to the ‘normals’ group.

Review:
Anyone who has studied role theory or symbolic interactionism will find the contents of this book familiar. The application of Symbolic Interactionism to stigma in such a forthright analysis like that presented in this book was, in all likelihood, novel at the time, but it would not be seen as groundbreaking today. Generally speaking, the application of a theory to a phenomenon that does not advance the theory – either through proof or disproof – would seldom result in publication in modern academia.

But by criticizing Goffman on this front I don’t mean to demean his work. The book is well-written, clear, and insightful and, apart from the lack of novelty, is an informative work on the social nature of stigma. While I don’t claim any expertise on social stigma or the study of characteristics that somehow result in differential treatment, I would guess that this book, like many of Goffman’s other books (e.g., Asylums), is simultaneously the apogee of previous work and the primary or seminal source for all work following this book. If you plan on studying stigma, you’ll have to read this book.

I do have two additional criticisms of the book. First, while it is undoubtedly written from a Symbolic Interactionist perspective, there is also a hint of structural-functionalism. This comes across at times as Goffman seems to indicate that stigma are a ‘necessary’ component of society. While they, like some form of religious belief, have likely existed in all known human societies, this does not mean that stigma are necessary. Though undoubtedly utopian, it is not too much of a stretch to imagine a society where stigma causing characteristics are socially deconstructed and therefore do not result in differential treatment. It may not ever happen, nor happen for generations, but it is feasible.

The second problem I had reading Stigma was that Goffman seems to be using secondary sources throughout the book for his insights. Goffman does not seem to have conducted any empirical investigation into the issue (e.g., interviewing maimed or deformed individuals who are socially stigmatized, etc.). Instead, Goffman relies heavily on autobiographies of stigmatized individuals and previous sociological and psychological research in this area. While the result remains informative and presents a coherent accumulation of the then known understanding, the arguments and claims would have been bolstered had they been situated in novel empirical findings.

Overall, students of stigmata and students of symbolic interactionism will find this book an invaluable reference.