American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future
Roof, Wade Clark, and William McKinney. 1987. American Mainline Religion: Its Changing Shape and Future. New Brunswick, NJ: Rutgers University Press.
Rating:
10
Summary:
The broad goal of this book is to explore the changes experienced by mainline religious groups. The authors are a bit schizophrenic in their use of “mainline.” Their first definition seems simple enough, “By mainline (or mainstream which is a frequently used synonym), we mean the dominant, culturally established faiths held by the majority of Americans” (p. 6). But they later change their definition to reflect a more nuanced understanding of the religious landscape of the 1980s, “What is meant by the term religious mainline? If mainline means anything it means a place in the center, but even that is not easy to define in today’s fluid religious context. “The ‘mainline’ or ‘mainstream’ of a phenomenon,” writes Richard John Neuhaus, “would seem to be that reality which requires little explanation. It is the obvious, the normative, the taken-for-granted. It is the standard of comparison against which the marginal, the fringe, the curious are all defined” (p. 73). In a sense the authors are forced to change their definition of the mainline to reflect the growth of conservative Protestantism that started in the 1970s; given its prominence, the second definition would increasingly be referring to conservative religious groups in the U.S. Despite recognizing the changing religious landscape, the authors continue to use their earlier definition of mainline, using the older religious traditions in the U.S. (Methodists, Episcopalians, Presbyterians, etc.) as their comparison groups.
The authors argue that mainline religions, those traditionally considered to belong to the WASP (white Anglo-Saxon Protestant) category, dominated the religious establishment throughout the nineteenth and much of the twentieth century, “For a hundred years or more, Americans made very little of pluralism; in self-perception if not in fact, the United States was a white country in which Protestant Christianity set the norms of religious observance and moral conduct. WASP influence shaped much of the public life. Catholics, Eastern Orthodox, Jews, and blacks often experienced prejudice and discrimination at the hands of a religious majority that viewed its identity as the same as the nation’s. The dominant religious tradition provided the symbolism and mythology that shaped the nation’s folklore, literature, theater, art, and music” (p. 35). But the authors also find that the cultural dominance of the mainline religions is on the decline, with two categories increasing both their share of the U.S. religious market and their sway on its culture: secular individuals or religious nonaffiliates (or “religious nones”; see p. 170) and religious conservatives, particularly conservative Protestants.
These changes are attributed, at least in part, to the “new voluntarism” and religious pluralism that leads to a breakdown in plausibility structures that function to maintain religious belief and affiliation. Voluntarism is a key focus of the book and refers to, “greater choice in religious affiliation and the more privatized psychology of religious faith and identity, in keeping with the cultural mood of the sixties and seventies” (p. 9). The religious nones have benefited the most from voluntarism and pluralism as the undermining of plausibility structures leads toward a disillusionment from organized religion.
The breakdown of plausibility structures also helps explain the rise of conservative groups – they tend to develop stronger plausibility structures (support networks of both people and ideas) that help to maintain religious belief. As a result, they have positioned themselves well in the religious marketplace and have a compelling product to sell (regardless of whether you believe they are actually providing a tangible product or not).
The ultimate conclusion of the book is that the religious mainline in the U.S. is on the decline. It not only isn’t holding the center, which was its former bastion of strength, but is losing its long-time adherents as they age and die. What’s more, the elderly are not being replaced by the young. Individuals raised in mainline religions today are more likely to drop out of religion altogether or move toward more conservative religious belief. In short, the future of mainline religions in the U.S. is bleak (later research has confirmed these findings).
Review:
Anyone interested in the growth and decline of mainline religions up to the mid 1980s must read this book. It is well-written and on-target. The authors are clearly informed about their subject matter and present remarkable insights about the both the history and future of mainline religions.
The only problem I had with this book is that the authors tend to get a little wordy in their descriptions and explanations, which led my mind to wander at times. There are plenty of concrete examples and statistics in the book, but the occasional, longer-than-necessary tangent into the abstract makes the book a bit more boring than it needs to be. Other than this small, general problem, the book has everything going for it.
In addition to the general conclusions drawn from the text, the book makes a variety of very good points, some of which are worth noting here. For instance, the authors note that the percentage of United Statesians who are Protestants is on the decline (from 67% in 1952 to 57% in 1985). While that finding is not surprising on its own, the corresponding change in the Protestant mentality in the U.S. as noted by Herberg is interesting, “Protestantism in America today presents the anomaly of a strong majority group with a growing minority consciousness” (p. 15). As anyone who follows the religious right can attest, this politically powerful block of voters are keen to claim they are picked on and shunned, when in fact Protestantism in the U.S. remains the dominant religious group. The “victim” mentality, while effective in gaining attention and media exposure, is a ruse and should be seen for what it is – a ploy to increase political influence and power. Protestantism may be a shrinking religious body in the U.S., but it is still the 600 lb. gorilla among chimps (well, Catholicism is now about a 500 lb. gorilla).
Another interesting point worth noting here is the contrast between nonaffiliates and individuals who are the most likely to be religious, “Studies show that the “unchurched” are disproportionately young, male, white, well educated, nonsouthern, and frequent movers. They are less conformist on social issues and cultural attitudes and far more tolerant and open to change. In profile characteristics they are the mirror image of those who are the most religiously committed—older persons, females, blacks, the lesser educated, southerners, and the geographically stable. So striking are the contrasts that the possibility of a growing cleavage between religious and secular America appeared more likely during the 1970s than at any time in the past quarter century” (p. 17). While I don’t think anyone should find it surprising that these two groups of people are extremely distinct, I do think many of the implications that can be drawn from this finding are interesting. For instance, if you look toward the specific congregations that are growing today, the “mega-churches,” it’s not hard to see where they are targeting their marketing efforts – toward those who fit the profile of the nonaffiliates rather than those who are traditionally religious. Additionally, and I find this point particularly interesting, many of the values embodied in U.S. culture are actually those seen in the nonaffiliates – young, educated, successful, mobile, tolerant (well, kind of). The fact that those values are prized in U.S. culture but the U.S. remains highly religious is an intriguing contrast.
An extension of the previous point is hinted at in the book, but not pushed toward its ultimate implication, “Among the religious communities there are disparities in age structures, some being more lopsided than others… Affiliates of all faiths are older than nonaffiliates; Jews are older than both Protestants and Catholics; Protestants are older than Catholics. Within Protestantism there are some striking differences: white Protestants are older than black Protestants, and liberal Protestants are older than conservative Protestants” (p. 153). What the authors imply but do not state outright is that the growing and vibrant religious groups (including religious nones) also tend to the be youngest ones (in terms of the age of the adherents and not necessarily in terms of the ages of the religions themselves). Certainly youth plays a part in that, but it also seems to tie into the marketing strategies of the religious groups who are growing (mega-churches and conservative bodies; there is no marketing strategy for religious disaffiliation, at least not a concerted one). While the authors may not have wanted to push their findings to include this assertion, I find the possibility of such a connection fascinating.
Overall, this is a well-written (if occasionally boring) book that is well worth reading for anyone with an interest in mainline religions, their history, and their future. The findings of the book point toward an increasingly bleak future for the religious bodies that at one time dominated the religious landscape in the U.S. Barring substantial changes and revitalizing efforts within their ranks, the future of the mainline is decline, obsolescence, and ultimately demise.