Religion and the Individual: A Social-Psychological Perspective
Batson, C. Daniel, Patricia Schoenrade, and W. Larry Ventis. 1993. Religion and the Individual: A Social-Psychological Perspective. New York: Oxford University Press.
Rating:
9
Summary:
The book actually has two objectives. First, it serves as a review of the social psychological literature on religion. Second, it presents original research of the authors and advocates for their theoretical perspective.
Since the authors required a book to summarize the state of the social psychological literature on religion, trying to summarize it in a short book review isn’t going to happen. I can, however, summarize the few points the authors cover in detail. First, the authors point out that they are not so much concerned with institutional religion but rather the “…the role of religion in the life of the individual – its origins, development, dynamics, functions, and consequences… Our goal is to provide a clear and coherent social-psychological picture of individual religion…” (p. v). The authors also explain that the goal of studying religion from a social psychological perspective is to “attempt to explain the nature and consequences of religion in the individual’s life, while at the same time keeping in mind the impact on the individual of his or her social environment” (p. 20). In short, the authors are interested in personal level religion, but recognize the social forces that influence religion at that level.
The authors proceed to outline some of the significant influences on personal religion, “…what may seem to be a freely chosen and highly personal religious stance is in large measure a product of social influence. To state this view strongly: You are free to choose only the religious stance that your particular social background dictates” (p. 25) Some of the significant influences on personal religiosity discussed include: parents, social class, race, and gender. Each of these differentially influence personal religiosity.
But the authors are quick to point out that personal religiosity is not entirely dictated by social presure, norms, and reference groups. Another component of personal religiosity is psychological. In this vein, the authors discuss a number of developmental psychological theories, drawing connections between the development of human cognition and religiosity. While there is no clear conclusion on this point, the authors do make it clear that personal religiosity is not due just to social pressure, but neither is it something innate or genetic. Personal religiosity is a combination of personal interest and decisions, both of which are limited and influenced by social-structural factors.
The remainder of the book discusses different orientations of personal religiosity and their relations to certain aspects of society. The orientation builds on the work of Gordon Allport who distinguished two types of religiosity and provided their corresponding labels: intrinsic and extrinsic religiosity. Extrinsic religiosity refers to people who use religion as a means to an end (e.g., social contacts). Intrinsic religiosity refers to people who see religion as the end (e.g., religion is the answer to life’s questions). The authors have actually spent a good deal of their careers refining Allport’s conception, re-working the original two categories and adding a third – quest religiosity. Quest religiosity refers to the religious seeker who constantly asks questions and may not believe there are any clear answers to them.
After outlining these three types of religiosity, the authors then explore the connections between religiosity – specified by their three types – and several social issues, including: health, charity, morality, and prejudice. Using a loose comparison between the religious and irreligious, in most cases religion comes down on the negative side of each of these social issues: religion does not improve health, does not increase charity, does not indicate a higher morality, and results in increased prejudice. However, and this is probably what the author’s intent was from the beginning, religiosity’s connections with these social issues is nuanced, depending on the type of religiosity. Generally speaking, intrinsic and quest religiosity are more positive than extrinsic religiosity.
The book concludes with a bold discussion of whether or not religion is good for humanity and society. Unfortunately, given the extensive nuance, a clear answer isn’t forthcoming. This is also unfortunate because this discussion provides sufficient ammunition for both sides to argue for their perspective: The religious individual could say that if you are intrinsically or quest oriented, then religion is good for you. Meanwhile, the irreligious individual could argue that religion, generally speaking, and extrinsic religion, specifically speaking, isn’t good for the individual or society.
Review:
great review of the social psychology of religion
Before touching on some of my critiques of the book, I should point out that this book is very informative, clearly written, and well worth reading. The authors, obviously experts in the social psychology of religion, have brought together years of study and research into a comprehensive volume that would make an excellent addition to the library of anyone interested in scientific understandings of religion.
That said, the book is not without its problems. To begin with, the authors employ a definition of religion that, in my opinion, is far too broad, “We shall define religion as whatever we as individuals do to come to grips personally with the questions that confront us because we are aware that we and others like us are alive and that we will die” (p. 8). The problem with this definition is that it can include individuals who use science or other naturalistic explanations to address such questions. While the authors would not have a problem with such an inclusion – and, in fact, include atheists who address such questions in their pool of ‘the religious’ – I prefer a more narrow definition. Including such a broad swath of people makes virtually everyone ‘religious’. If everyone is religious, then you aren’t really studying religion, just human nature and the tendency of humans to ask existential questions. My definition would simply add the caveat that answers must include some element of supernature in order to qualify as religious. With a supernatural component included, the analysis is limited to the more traditional understandings of religion – including practitioners of New Age and other more esoteric religions that focus on spirituality and not on organized religion. This difference would still result in a broad definition, but it wouldn’t include virtually everyone.
I should also point out while I’m discussing the authors’ definition of religion that, almost by definition, people who fall into their extrinsically oriented religiosity category could be argued to not be religious as they are affiliating themselves with religion only superficially and not actually asking existential questions. This is a significant problem for their analysis considering extrinsic religiosity is one of the three primary categories the authors cover in detail. A better definition of religion is in order.
Another criticism is likely due more to the date of publication of the book and not to an oversight on the part of the authors. In discussing the influence of education on religiosity, the authors conclude that while college education seems to result in a decline of religiosity, it is only temporary. Given the state of research on this question when they wrote their book (actually revised their book), this interpretation makes sense. However, an important study published in 1997 by Daniel Carson Johnson draws a clearer picture. Religious decline may be temporary for some individuals, but what the authors were really seeing in the studies was a dichotomization of religiosity as a result of college education. Those who make it through college with their religious beliefs intact tend to be more devout than those who do not attend college to begin with yet remain religious. On the other side, those who don’t make it through college with their religious beliefs intact end up far less orthodox and are more likely to disavow religion altogether. Thus, the real relationship is a dichotomization – college education strengthens both religiosity and irreligiosity, it just depends on where you end up. Johnson’s finding is particularly relevant in light of the author’s extensive discussion of Festinger’s findings concerning cognitive dissonance and how religious people reinforce their beliefs in light of disconfirming evidence. If the authors decide to revise their book in the future, they should revise their understanding of education’s influence on religiosity.
This next criticism may not be relevant to the author’s research, as they have seemingly moved away from Gordon Allport’s original questionnaire and classifications of extrinsic and intrinsic religiosity. But the criticism is relevant for those who continue to use this classification scheme for religious individuals. The authors point out that Allport’s scale measures were flawed and not actually measuring what he thought they were (religious commitment instead of intrinsic religiosity; see pp. 163-164). In light of such findings, I have to question why people continue to use Allport’s classifications at all. The author’s have revised Allport’s scales and claim their new classification scheme (three categories instead of two) is valid. I do, however, have one question about the methodology they employ in validating their scale. On page 174 the authors describe their factor analysis as orthogonal, meaning they did not allow their factors to correlate. However, in light of the finding that Allport’s scale measures did correlate (factor analysis is an easy way to discover this), I find it somewhat disingenuous on the part of the authors to simply present their analysis without saying what their scales looked like when they were allowed to correlate (say, using Direct Oblimin rotation rather than Varimax rotation). After all, they are measuring different components of personal religiosity and, as has been shown in numerous measures of religiosity (see Hill and Hood 1999), different factors tend to correlate. Admittedly, the authors try to simplify their discussion of factor analysis as it is complicated, but they should at least footnote this part and explain why they chose not to let their factors correlate in light of the fact that most measures of religiosity do correlate.
Another problem with the analysis that is repeated throughout the book is that it continually focuses on differences between the religious without pointing out that there is an entire group of people who are not religious who should be included in these comparisons. For instance, in discussing prejudice, the authors point out that extrinsically oriented people are far more prejudiced than are intrinsically or quest oriented religious people (p. 304). But just a few pages earlier the authors had pointed out that non-religious people are far less-prejudiced than any of these groups. This continued oversight led me to wonder if it would not be of more utility to simply build continuum-like scales that range from completely irreligious to highly religious and forgo the distinctions among the religious. Such scales would provide information on the broader picture of religiosity rather than focusing narrowly on just differences between the religious. (I do have to note that in this particular case they do return to the comparison between the religious and irreligious at the end of their discussion; see p. 310).
I found one of the authors’ claims to be misleading if not plainly erroneous, “All major religions preach love and acceptance of others – all others” (pp. 293-294). While I don’t claim to be an expert on all major religions, I do know a thing or two about them and I don’t believe this is an accurate statement. The major religions may superficially claim to be accepting of all people, but their beliefs are generally laced with caveats. Heretics and non-believers are vilified and even members of other religions are often denigrated. Granted the authors go on to point out that religiosity is positively correlated with prejudice (the more religious you are, the more prejudiced you are), which undermines religions’ claims to the contrary, but unless the authors are aware of actual pronouncements of tolerance and acceptance by all major religions, I think they may be creating a false dichotomy. Or, worst case scenario, they are simply wrong.
While I believe some of my criticisms are substantial (and I will cover one more below), I recognize that they are minor in comparison to the positive aspects of this book. For instance, the authors take a position in the first chapter that, until now, I have not seen any social scientists studying religion take: they recognize that the social scientific study of religion can actually undermine faith, “As we noted earlier, the psychologist’s task is to address these same questions, although in more general terms. The problem is that the psychologist’s answers may provide plausible alternatives to the answers of the religious individual, thereby challenging the individual’s beliefs. It is important for the social psychologist to be honest at this point. Often, social psychologists bend over backward to emphasize the limited relevance and impact of their research. In stark contrast, our experience observing the reactions of religious individuals suggests that social-psychological research on religion has so much potential for relevance and impact that the consumer should be warned. It is frequently said that science cannot prove the existence or nonexistence of God, and we would agree. But it is frequently also said that a scientific study of religion carries no implications for a person’s religious beliefs; here we would disagree” (p. 14). The authors go on to point out how the social scientific study of religion can undermine faith (by providing plausible and more parsimonious explanations). I believe it is high time all social scientists studying religion admitted how studying religion from this perspective can undermine faith. Kudos to the authors for being bold enough to admit it.
I also have to point out that even though the authors were addressing a serious topic and wading through hundreds of scientific studies, they actually seemed to make an effort to include some humor. Granted, it wasn’t very often, but sometimes it was quite funny. For instance, the authors recount Carlos Castaneda’s experience with peyote in discussing the possible connections between psychotropic drugs and religiosity (p. 125). This has to be one of the funniest stories I’ve ever heard. Basically, Mr. Castaneda, in recounting his experience, talks about how spiritual it was as he moved toward ‘yellow warmth’ and found brotherhood with the dog that his Native American host had in the house. As it turns out, that yellow warmth was him pissing on the dog and the dog pissing on him. Brilliant!
I should also point out that, while the authors do a good job of balancing their support and criticism of religion, the book does not try to minimize the problems with religion. For instance, in exploring one element of religiosity, the authors point out that individuals who have had conversion experiences, especially intense ones, “gave significantly more responses that appeared to reflect what in psychoanalytic terms is called primitive, non-logical thinking” (p. 111). The authors don’t try to hide the problems with religion, but they do their best to provide evidence that religion isn’t all bad. So, while their treatment is certainly fair, do keep in mind that they are critical of religion, and rightfully so (see the quote from p. 343 for another strong indictment of religion).
To conclude, I want to talk briefly about the authors’ final chapter. In that chapter, they address the question of whether religion is good for society or not. I need to point out that I’m impressed by the boldness of the authors for raising the question. Even so, I don’t think their wish-washy conclusion is compelling. Basically, the authors conclude that if you are intrinsic or quest oriented, then religion can be a good thing. But if you are extrinsically religious, then religion tends to be a bad thing. While this conclusion fits their findings, it also overlooks the actual implications. Basically, the authors are arguing that only two types of religiosity are good for the individual and/or society. The third obviously is not. But, and the authors point this out earlier in the book, the majority of religious people fall into the extrinsically-oriented category. And, it may actually be the case that in order to arrive at the two ‘good’ categories, you have to pass through the bad one. In short, the probability of actual belonging to one of the ‘good’ religious categories is small enough that, in my opinion, the safest conclusion concerning whether religion is good or not for society is obvious – it is not good for society. Just because a few religious people are better than other religious people (but worse than non-religious people) does not indicate to me that we should keep a social institution that negatively affects the majority of its adherents. I’m not going to speculate as to why the authors chose to defend religion, but given the evidence they present and the arguments they make, the conclusion should be obvious – religion is not society’s friend.