Public Religion in the Modern World
Casanova, Jose. 1994. Public Religion in the Modern World. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Rating:
6
Review:
The initial premise of Jose Casanova’s 1995 book, Public Religions in the Modern World, seems bold and daring – proposing that there is a place for public religions in a modern, secular world. But the conclusion of the book undermines the overt premise as what the author actually concludes is a complex modification of what it means to be a ‘public’ religion.
The book begins by arguing that the 1980s saw a reversal in the trend of privatization that was characterizing religions around the world. During this decade, a number of religions moved from the private, individual sphere of personal salvation to the public spheres of ‘publicity’ and ‘political involvement’ (p. 3).
Casanova then presents the first version of his book’s thesis,
The central thesis of the present study is that we are witnessing the “deprivatization” of religion in the modern world. By deprivatization I mean the fact that religious traditions throughout the world are refusing to accept the marginal and privatized role which theories of modernity as well as theories of secularization had reserved for them. (p. 5)
What follows is a lengthy discussion of what it means to be a public religion and how being a ‘public religion’ is possible considering classical secularization theory has argued for the differentiation and diminution of religion for the last 150 years. In this discussion, Casanova does make several important points, including a reconsideration of what is meant by secularization. Casanova argues that secularization is actually used to refer to, “three different propositions: secularization as religious decline, secularization as differentiation, and secularization as privatization” (p. 7). As a result of this distinction, Casanova argues that the three dimensions of secularization must be analyzed separately, which is a valid point. However, rather than discuss each topic in turn, he dismisses the first proposition off-handedly within the very same paragraph, “The assumption that religion will tend to disappear with progressive modernization, a notion which has proven patently false as a general empirical proposition, is traced genealogically back to the Enlightenment critique of religion.”
The rest of the theoretical discussion centers around the second two propositions, namely differentiation and privatization. Casanova does not seem to have a problem with societal differentiation, the result of which is primarily distinct (though admittedly fluid) spheres for religion and the other elements of society.
But the proposition of secularization which most interests Casanova, and with which his book takes issue, is the idea of religious privatization. Casanova believes religions are, want to be, and can continue to be ‘public’ institutions. He believes secularization theory has unduly relegated religion to the ‘private’ sphere, the result being that only, “established state churches are designated as “public” religions whereas all other religions are considered to be “private” (p. 55).
Casanova then uses comparative historical analysis to illustrate how religions can vary as ‘public’ institutions. Casanova analyzes the historical development of five socio-religious relationships from the late 1700s through the present in four countries using two religions: Catholicism in Spain, Catholicism in Brazil, Catholicism in Poland, evangelical Protestantism in America, and Catholicism in America.
Casanova argues that his historical analysis of these socio-religious relationships results in a refined understanding of what it means to be a ‘public’ religion,
This study has constructed a particular typology of public religions using the tripartite division of the modern democratic polity into state, political society, and civil society. Since to each of these levels there corresponds a different form of public sphere, there can be in principle public religions at the state level, public religions active in political society, and public religions which participate in the public sphere of civil society. (p. 218)
But Casanovas revised understanding of ‘public’ religion is only part of his conclusion. Casanova ultimately concludes that, “privatization is not a modern structural trend” but rather an option,
In other words, this study has tried to show that there can be and that there are public religions in the modern world which do not need to endanger either modern individual freedoms or modern differentiated structures. It is true that, like religious decline, privatization is also a dominant historical trend in many societies, usually in the same ones which experience religious decline, both processes being interrelated. But privatization is not a modern structural trend but, rather, a historical option. To be sure, it seems to be a modern “preferred option,” but it is an option nonetheless. (p. 215)
Despite making some valid points, there are a number of problems with both the book and the author’s conclusions. One of the biggest problems with the book is the nearly unintelligible historical analysis of the first three countries, Spain, Brazil, and Poland. None of the chapters begins with a clearly articulated plan for analyzing the relationship between Catholicism and the socio-religious development of the country. In each treatment, Casanova jumps around both conceptually and chronologically and, without the reader having at least some prior knowledge of the histories of these countries and the involvement of Catholicism with their governments, the writing is difficult to understand at best and indecipherable at worst. Thankfully the poor historical treatment improves once the analysis moves to America and its relationship with both evangelical Protestantism and Catholicism.
A second problem with the historical analysis is a continual overstatement of the influence of religion. Seldom is the influence of any other group, movement, or individual (other than Catholic priests or bishops) included in Casanova’s analyses of the numerous revolutions that took place in both Spain and Brazil. As the author depicts it, one might think sole responsibility for the current democratic regimes in Spain, Brazil, and Poland lies with the Roman Catholic Church. Admittedly the Catholic Church was influential, especially in Poland, but it did not act alone. Given the author’s inclusion of social movement theories to describe the deprivitazation of evangelical protestantism in America, it would also have been nice to see him branch out to take into consideration the other forces that were actively involved in all of these transitions (corporate and political interests in the conservative, evangelical movement in America during the 1980s and the educated intelligentsia in Spain, Brazil, and Poland, to name just two).
Before discussing the problems in Casanova’s conclusions, an element of his conceptualization of secularization warrants additional discussion. Because a few countries have witnessed relatively recent involvement of religion in ‘public’ life (in the last few decades), Casanova considers this involvement ‘recent’ and uses it to bolster his argument that religion’s ‘public’ life is not over. But Casanova’s conceptualization of secularization is wholly unfair. He presents secularization as though it should have immediately reached its apex (the non-existence of religion, or at the very least, the complete privatization of religion) after its initial formulations. The concept of secularization is no more than two to three hundred years old and was only clearly formulated and advocated in the mid-nineteenth century. By arguing that secularization is an ill-founded theory because religion is still around and occasionally makes forays into public life is akin to arguing homo sapiens are unintelligent because they have existed for 2 to 5 million years but did not develop a steam engine 500,000 years ago. None of the early advocates of secularization, nor any of the current advocates of neo-secularization, hold the erroneous assumption that the complete secularization of society is going to take place over night, or, to put it on a relative timeline, over 150 to 200 years from its earliest formulations. Casanova’s relativization of recency is misleading.
The analytical and conceptual problems are fairly minor compared to the problems with Casanova’s conclusions. Only one of the five cases, Poland, presents even minor support for his argument that privatization is a choice. Casanova eventually admits that, “Of the case studies analyzed in this book, today such a scenario [a public religion which participates in the public sphere of civil society] seems plausible, although unlikely, only in Poland” (p. 220). He goes on to admit that the rest of the case studies support the idea of religious deprivatization only insofar as they are “taking a public stand for the sake of defending the very right to a modern public sphere” (p. 220). In other words, only in Poland is religion still highly integrated into public life.
But even this one case is highly suspect considering Poland’s social, political, and religious history is incomparably distinct from all of the other cases. Though Spain and Brazil experienced brief periods of Communist government, neither were under the control of Communism for near the length of time that Poland was. Couple this fact with Casanova’s own analysis of Poland’s religious history that includes the purging of Jews from the country during World War II, and the result is a distinct relationship with Roman Catholicism; a relationship that is arguably different from the relationship of Roman Catholicism with any other country in the world. But even with these distinctions, Casanova eventually admits that Poland is teetering on the edge of “the vicious cycles of the nineteenth-century French-Latin pattern of secularization” (p. 109) and has already witnessed significant declines in religious authority as Catholics are increasingly disregarding their church’s stance on abortion (p. 113).
As I read the successive case studies and realized that they did not seem to support Casanova’s propositions (nor his conclusions), I could not help but question the contribution of this book. My suspicion that the book had no real contribution was partially validated when the author stated, “Consequently, the case studies were not constructed in such a way that they would best confirm any theory or illustrate any typology” (p. 218). I couldn’t help but wonder if Casanova had actually set out to do something else entirely with his analyses.
This realization was particularly disconcerting considering these analyses could contribute to an understanding of the resourcefulness of religion in movement mobilization. Repeatedly, I was struck by how religion was used by groups to accomplish their ends: to overthrow Communism in Poland, to work towards a political voice for the Moral Majority in America, etc. In each of these processes, religion appeared to ‘deprivatize’ primarily because the movements exploited its ability to produce solidarity. But it also seems that in each case once the ‘end’ was achieved, the ‘means’ was discarded, or at least began a process of decline. Casanova could have used his analyses to illustrate very different processes, but instead chose to argue for a theoretical subtlety that was at best only minimally supported by his data.
It also seemed as though Casanova was using his book as a sounding board for commentary on present-day Roman Catholicism. He levels a few criticisms at Catholicism, but primarily seems to be offering advice, “Only by retreating again to a private sectarian refuge and abandoning its claims to be a public religion in the modern world can the church [Roman Catholicism] escape the unintended consequences of having entered the modern public sphere” (p. 207).
Ultimately, I’m unsure what, if anything, Casanova intended to accomplish with this book. The primary thesis (which changed according to my count at least five times), that religions have the choice to privatize or not in the modern world, seemed to find only minimal support, and that only in a very unique case. Perhaps I was hoping for a more definitive and clear cut conclusion than the ambiguous final thought the author provides,
Western modernity is at a crossroads. If it does not enter into a creative dialogue with the other, with those traditions which are challenging its identity, modernity will most likely triumph. But it may end up being devoured by the inflexible, inhuman logic of its own creations. It would be profoundly ironic if, after all the beatings it has received from modernity, religion could somehow unintentionally help modernity save itself. (p. 234)
Do religions have the choice to freely enter into the ‘public’ sphere? Based on the evidence provided by Casanova, I’m inclined to believe secularization has advanced too far to allow that to happen in all but the most extreme cases (Iran and perhaps Poland). The irony is that Casanova intended to convince me otherwise.