new book review - God is Dead: Secularization in the West
God is Dead: Secularization in the West
Author:
Steve Bruce
Publisher:
Blackwell Publishing
Date of Publication:
2002
ISBN:
0631232745
Rating:
10
Summary:
The book is a detailed explanation of secularization theory and a succinct but well-developed collection of evidence supporting the theory. The author describes secularization as “a social condition manifest in (a) the declining importance of religion for the operation of non-religious roles and institutions such as those of the state and the economy; (b) a decline in the social standing of religious roles and institutions; and (c) a decline in the extent to which people engage in religious practices, display beliefs of a religious kind, and conduct other aspects of their lives in a manner informed by such beliefs” (p. 3). Secularization theory, fundamentally, proposes that modernization is responsible for the decline of religion.
Bruce goes on to explain how modernization leads to declines in religiosity, “When the total, all-embracing community of like-situated people working and playing together gives way to the dormitory town or suburb, there is little held in common left to celebrate. The consequence of differentiation and societalization is that the plausibility of any single overarching moral and religious system declined, to be displaced by competing conceptions that, while they may have had much to say to privatized, individual experience, could have little connection to the performance of social roles or the operation of social systems. Religion retained subjective plausibility for some people, but lost its objective taken-for grantedness. It was no longer a matter of necessity; it was a preference” (pp. 13-14). As society developed and specialization (in terms of occupations and organizational functions) occurred, there was a breakdown in small communities. The result of that breakdown was exposure to different worldviews (e.g., a Catholic living next door to a Hindu and a Muslim). Exposure to different worldviews results in the religious worldview losing its over-arching, all-encompassing nature. By virtue of interaction with people who hold different worldviews it becomes apparent that you hold your worldview by choice, not by default. This is very similar to Peter Berger’s understanding of plausibility structures.
There are, of course, some situations in which religion remains strong. Bruce explains two such situations. The first is where religion retains an important role in group identity, especially when it is tied to one’s ethnicity or national character. The second is during the process of modernization – the initial breakdown of communities results in a sense of disconnectedness. Religion is often seen as the salve for such a sentiment, though it tends to be short-lived in that regard (see page 31).
Despite the exceptions to secularization outlined in the preceding paragraph, the basic argument of secularization is that in modernized, Western-style nations, religion is declining. And, as Bruce notes, secularization theorists “…are claiming irreversibility, rather than inevitability” (p. 38), which is to say, secularization may not be inevitable for every country (though it likely it is), but once it occurs, it is irreversible. At the aggregate level, people do not become secular then return to religion.
In developing this argument Bruce looks to history to illustrate that our ancestors were more religious in the past than they are today. Bruce’s focus is on Great Britain, but the same argument holds true around the world. In contrast to the arguments of the rational choice and religious economies advocates (e.g., Stark, Iannaccone, Finke), Bruce notes that religiosity in bygone days is not identical to what we consider religious in the modern era, “The case does not require that the starting point of the comparative description be a society of theologically competent committed Christians enmeshed in a hegemonic dominant ideology†(p. 58). What is required is an all-encompassing worldview that is dominated by supernaturalism. That worldview was pervasive, even if the average person in the time period was not theologically competent.
Bruce also looks at New Age religion and the argument by some that New Age illustrates that religion is undergoing a revival. Bruce makes several important points in this regard. First, he notes that the number of practitioners of New Age is very, very small, not enough to offset the losses to the major religions (like Methodism in the UK). Second, Bruce explains that New Age religion is thoroughly modernized – it is individualistic, privatized, pro-consumer, and low commitment, “Instead of recruiting loyal followers, they market their services to people who will take some course, attend some events, and then move on to some other revelation or therapy” (p. 84). Additionally, the focus is increasingly on how religion is good for you in this life and less on what you need to do or believe to gain some reward in a next life. In short, New Age religion is religion for consumers in modernized countries. As such, it is not much of a religious revival but rather another illustration that secularization is taking place.
Bruce uses the example of New Age religion to discuss an important difference in his perspective compared to that of people like Rodney Stark, “The colleagues with whom I differ about the future of religion in the West are, I believe, being misled by their failure to appreciate two things. First, diffuse beliefs of the sort we see in liberal Christianity and New Age spirituality (the denominational and cultic forms of religion) cannot sustain the forms of social organization that can act as a bulwark against secularization. Secondly, the ethos of the modern society (individual autonomy, social and cultural diversity, practical relativism) is a uniquely hostile environment for any minority belief-system” (pp. 149-150). As Bruce explains things, most religion moves in the direction of more liberal and diffuse beliefs. If that is true, and there is plenty of evidence to indicate that it is, then the future of religion is bleak – such beliefs cannot sustain movements and organizations.
That said, Bruce is quick to point out that religious revivals can take place. But he provides testable hypotheses as to whether such revivals truly represent a reversal of secularization, which would refute the theory, “This is a long way round to saying that there is nothing in my view of secularization that makes periodic resurgences of interest in enthusiastic or sectarian religion unexpected. They would refute my approach only if (a) the totals remaining at the end of any of these cycles were greater than those lost or (b) those recruited in any resurgence had previously been outside the churches†(p. 177). Bruce finds no evidence that such resurgences have taken place. In short, at present there is no evidence contradicting the secularization approach.
Bruce wraps things up with a discussion of postmodernism, which I will not summarize here. But he also spends a chapter looking at religion in the U.S. Based on his familiarity with the sociological literature on religiosity in the U.S., Bruce concludes four things about secularization in the U.S., “First, there is ample evidence of Christianity in the USA losing power, prestige and popularity. Secondly, there is ample evidence that Christianity in the USA has changed in ways expected by the secularization paradigm: greater emphasis on individual choice, a shift from other-worldly to this-worldly salvation, and an increasing therapeutic orientation to religion. Thirdly, for all the sound and fury that accompanied the ‘new Christian right’ (NCR)… there has been no significant reversal of the major trend of religion becoming marginal to the operation of the social system. Finally, to the extent that the USA does differ from Europe, the differences can be explained in ways that are perfectly consistent with the secularization paradigm” (p. 204). Thus, while the focus of the book is religious decline in the United Kingdom, Bruce argues that a similar (but slower) decline is also taking place in the U.S. The U.S. may seem like it bucks the secularization trend, but when closely scrutinized it becomes apparent that religion is on the decline in the U.S. as well.
Review:
I really have nothing negative to say about this book except maybe to point out that there are a few typos (enough that they are noticeable). Otherwise, this is, hands down, the clearest, most compelling explication of secularization theory and its supporting evidence I have ever read. Bruce not only understands the theory but has a gift for explaining it to others. This is a must read book for any serious student of the sociology of religion. A few additional attributes of the book are worth noting.
Bruce doesn’t actually stoop to the level of Rodney Stark in flinging insults at those who disagree with him, but he also doesn’t hold back what he thinks of Stark’s work. In a forthright but collegial way he takes Stark and his co-authors to task on a number of fronts, “In 1985, when Rodney Stark and William S. Bainbridge wanted to represent the secularization paradigm (in order to show it false), they ignored the sociologists who had developed those ideas and instead cited a 1960s undergraduate textbook written by an anthropologist” (p. 1). Another good example is this quote from page 106, “Rodney Stark, for example, who should know better, says of the secularization paradigm: ‘implicit in all versions, and explicit in most, is the claim that of all aspects of modernization, it is science that has the most deadly implications for religion (Stark and Finke 2000: 61)” (p. 106). While I agree that it is probably implicit in some, Bruce does clearly illustrate that it is not explicit in any of the work of the major contributors to secularization. Stark, the most well known name in the sociology of religion, does not give secularization theory a fair treatment, and Bruce is right in pointing that out.
Another important characteristic of this book is its fair, unbiased treatment of the subject matter. Bruce may or may not be a disinterested observer of the decline of religion; he may want it or he may not. The reason I bring this up is because, after reading the book, I honestly cannot tell. Bruce admits at one point to being confronted about his nonchalant attitude in this regard, but that doesn’t mean the book is pro- or anti-religion. Bruce simply states the case without editorializing, which contrasts with some sociologists of religion, like Stark and Finke, who do editorialize in their work.
The only point where I’m not exactly sure I agree with Bruce is in his assertion that, “Science and technology do not create atheists; they just reduce the frequency and seriousness with which people attend to religion” (p. 27). There is evidence that elite scholars (members of the National Academy of Sciences) are less religious than other scientists and far less religious than the general public (and more likely to be atheists). But that evidence aside, this is a case of implying a relationship without explicitly stating one. If people become apatheists (people who see religion as irrelevant to them), this may not equate to atheism, but it does generally indicate that science and technology are, in a sense, oppositional to religion. In short, I don’t think it is accurate to claim that the only influence of science on religiosity is a decreased interest in participation. I believe science lays a groundwork that, for many people, undermines the claims of religion. It certainly does not undermine everyone’s religious belief, but it is a clear alternative to the religious worldview and should be seen in such a light.
Another very important element of this book is that it develops a number of testable hypotheses. For instance, Bruce offers the following hypotheses concerning the theory of secularization, “The religious revival in the fishing communities of Norfolk and the north-east of Scotland (Griffin 2000) does not disprove secularization, but a recurrence in any Western country of anything on the scale of John Wesley’s Methodist revivals most certainly will” (p. 41). Admittedly it will take time to witness a revival of that sort. But the hypothesis is testable. Another involves Methodism in the UK, which has experienced significant declines in its membership over the last 50 years, “In 1947 there were 743,000 Methodists in Britain. In 1995 there were 380,000†(p. 67). Bruce notes that, “If that remarkably consistent trend continues (and Sawkins can see nothing to indicate it will not), the Methodist Church will cease to exist in 2031 (Sawkins 1998)” (p. 67). While this is not a prophecy, it is a clear, qualified projection. If the current rate of decline in Methodism in the UK continues unabated, the religion will disappear in 25 years. That is, again, a testable hypothesis. There are other hypotheses and propositions outlined in the book. The next step for secularization theorists really should be to formalize these hypotheses and develop a research agenda to put them to the test.
Finally, while not a major feature of the book, the author is occasionally quite humorous. I particularly liked this little example, “There is no reason why knowing about something should lead to taking it seriously or adopting it. I know about exercise and its virtues but do not do much of it. I know about Islam but have not become a Muslim” (p. 122). While clearly making a broader point, Bruce’s humor and clarity of thought are often so simple and straightforward that the resulting insights are humorous.
Overall, this is a superb book. It is clearly written and extremely well-organized. The timing of the publication of this book is superb – it is a magnificent rebuttal to all things rational choice and religious economies in the sociology of religion. Steve Bruce has done the scientific study of religion a huge service in this book. If you have any interest in this field of inquiry, you should read this book.
