Ryan, Debi, and Toren Cragun's Blog

Title:
Zuckerman, Phil. 2008. Society without God: What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us About Contentment. NYU Press.

Rating:
9/10

Review:
The correlation between societal secularism and societal health is an issue that has not received much attention in the sociology of religion. Paul (2005) asserted that societal secularism leads to healthier societies (i.e., one in which poverty is not widespread, crime rates are low, and there is a social safety net of government programs that prevent serious hardship). Norris and Inglehart (2004) show quite convincingly that a sense of existential security, which is derived primarily from living in healthy societies, leads to decreases in religiosity. Thus, some scholars suggest secularism leads to societal health while other suggest the opposite, societal health leads to secularism. Which is it?

• societal health ? existential security ? secularism
• secularism ? existential security ? societal health

The problem here is an issue of causality. Of course, it is possible that we are dealing with a non-recursive relationship: as one increases, it causes the other to increase and vice versa. That may not be the case as not all secular countries have high levels of societal health (though for generally obvious reasons like religion was forcibly removed, e.g., communist countries). But this is a legitimate question that has not been carefully explored in the sociological literature.

In light of the above problem of causality between secularism and societal health, I approached Zuckerman’s book with some hesitation. I thought Zuckerman might try to suggest secularism leads to healthy societies given the subtitle of the book “What the Least Religious Nations Can Tell Us About Contentment.” As it turns out, Zuckerman carefully sidesteps my concerns and the causal quandary and instead focuses on a slightly different issue: Is it possible that people can be secular and happy? This question is related to a question that has come up regularly in the sociology of religion and is therefore a topic of interest to sociologists: Are there some people who do not turn to religion when facing death?

Why is this of interest? Stark and Finke’s (2001) formulation of rational choice theory takes as its starting point the assumption that all people have a need for “supernatural compensators” in order to deal with the mystery of death. This formulation of rational choice theory is not alone in asserting this fundamental need for religion. Andrew Greeley has argued that religious needs are “inherent in the human condition” and Christian Smith has suggested that humans are simply driven to faith in religious ideas (p. 55). If it can be shown that not all people need religion to compensate for the mystery of death and that not all people feel a “need” for religion, this foundational assumption is unsound. Theories that rely on it are, therefore, also unsound. Thus, Zuckerman, smartly tackles a less problematic issue than that of causality. Intentionally avoiding the bigger question (p. 29), Zuckerman’s topic is actually quite foundational considering its role in so many prominent theories of religion.

So, how does Zuckerman propose to test this assumption? Zuckerman moved to a secular country, Denmark, for a year with his family (p. 3). During that year, he formally interviewed close to 150 Danes and Swedes and informally spoke with hundreds more. He observed and read extensively about the countries. His interviews and research allowed him to paint a picture of Danish religiosity and social life.

Denmark is, of course, one of the most secular countries on the planet, though what that means has to be qualified. Most Danes consider themselves Christian, many are members of the state church of Denmark (which is Lutheran), and many pay 1% of their income in taxes to the state church. That would seem to make them religious. But not many Danes actually believe in god (less than 30%). What’s more, most of them don’t believe in Jesus, let alone that he atoned for sins (only 21% even believe in sin). Danes are unlikely to believe in heaven (18% do) or hell (10% do). Only 7% of Danes believe the Bible to be inerrant. And most Danes never go to church (only 12% go once a month or more). In fact, those who do believe in god in Denmark are kind of like those who don’t in America – they are the oddballs and deviants (p. 12). So, what do Danes mean when they say they are “Christian”? Two things: (1) it is part of Danish culture to be so and (2) they find it important to treat others as they would like to be treated. Thus, Danes are only religious in a cultural sense: it’s part of their culture to belong to the state church and say you’re Christian (p. 150), but they don’t believe in the supernatural aspects of religion and almost never go to church (the exception being cultural rituals like weddings).

So, Denmark is secular. What about societal health? Well, there is virtually no poverty, crime rates are relatively low, social safety nets are secure (i.e., universal health care and employment benefits are generous), the economy is healthy, and the people are the happiest on the planet (literally, they are ranked #1). This clearly illustrates that religion is not a pre-requisite of societal health or general levels of happiness. But it doesn’t directly address the question of interest: Do Danes draw on religion when it comes to death? And what about meaning in life? Do Danes derive meaning for their lives from religion?

Zuckerman deals with these questions directly by asking many of the 150 people he interviewed how they deal with death and whether they consider meaning in life. Generally he found that death was not something Danes considered on a regular basis, but even when they did, they were not afraid of it (p. 65). In fact, one interviewee, a hospice nurse, suggested that it was religious Danes who had the hardest time dealing with death as they were worried about their eternal fate (pp. 4-5). Atheists and agnostics, on the other hand, believed it was the end and didn’t worry themselves about it. On the specific question of whether religion is required to deal with death, Zuckerman’s data suggests the answer is a resounding NO! This finding, in my opinion, is the primary contribution of Zuckerman’s book. It should lead social scientists who study religion to rethink their theories and assumptions. No longer can a scholar claim that religion is an innate need or a fundamental drive. It is not. People do not need and, in fact, live quite happily without it. People are religious for social and cultural reasons. There is no biological imperative toward religiosity. End of debate.

In addition to finding that Danes do not require religion to deal with death, Zuckerman also finds that most Danes don’t think too much about the meaning of life, and when they do, they do not draw upon religion (p. 73). Once again, a classic argument of many scholars that religion fulfills an innate need to understand the meaning of life is rebuffed. Religion may serve this function for some, but it is not required. End of debate.

An additional contribution of this book is the overall picture of (ir-)religiosity in Denmark and Sweden. Zuckerman actually struggles with how to study the “absence of something” (p. 76), that something being religion. What he finds is that Danes and Swedes just don’t give much thought to religion. It’s not important to them, which is what secularization theorists suggest is the end result of secularization. To be an atheist you have to care about religion. Not many Danes are atheists; they simply don’t think about these issues because they are irrelevant to them. For most Scandinavians, religion and god are things you toy with when you are young, then you forget about them when you get older and move on with your life (p. 94). Religion is a non-issue in Denmark and Sweden not because it is a private issue but because people simply don’t care about religion (p. 102).

A final issue Zuckerman addresses in the book is why some countries are religious and others are not. Zuckerman doesn’t really break new ground theoretically on this front. Instead, he draws on multiple theories and offers those as explanations. For the low levels of religiosity in Denmark, Zuckerman suggests: (1) the lack of competition (due to lazy monopoly state churches), (2) the high levels of existential security, and (3) the gender egalitarianism. All of these are probably part of the explanation. As for the higher levels of religiosity in the US, Zuckerman suggests the opposites are all true (competition leading to marketable religions, lower levels of security, and higher levels of gender inequality) plus: (1) the US was settled by religious Europeans (after the Native Americans, of course); (2) we are a nation of immigrants and immigrants tend to cling to their cultural traditions, which include religion; and (3) we are diverse, which makes religion useful as a tool of identity formation – it makes you part of a group. What’s novel about this approach is that Zuckerman doesn’t argue for one theory over another but instead suggests that many theories help explain higher and lower levels of religiosity. He is probably right.

Lest you think there are no problems with the book, I will point out two. First, the sampling method is not random. Zuckerman admits this. He uses a snowball sampling technique – he met someone, interviewed him, then asked him for references and so on. This is a legitimate problem, but a relatively minor one considering that the findings from the interviews align quite well with the large scale surveys of Danes and Swedes he draws upon. That doesn’t completely overcome the problem of representativeness, but it does suggest that his interview data is useful for answering the questions he asks.

The second problem is also minor: Zuckerman is biased. As a secular Jew, Zuckerman describes living in Denmark as a “breath of secular fresh air” (p. 8). This may be exactly what Zuckerman hoped to find. But there is no indication that what Zuckerman hoped to find influenced what he actually did find. Thus, despite the bias of the author, the book’s findings hold.

Overall, this modest book undermines many of the widely accepted theories in the sociology of religion today by illustrating that the assumption of an innate need for religion is unsound. People do not need religion. In fact, many of those who are not religious get along quite well without it. Zuckerman skirts the causality issue between secularism and societal health, but he compellingly illustrates that you can be happy and not religious. This is a must read for anyone who thinks religion is required for people to be happy.

Bonus Quotes:
p. 30 “It is a great socio-religious irony-for lack of a better term-that when we consider the fundamental values and moral imperatives contained within the world’s great religions, such as caring for the sick, the infirm, the elderly, the poor, the orphaned, the vulnerable; practicing mercy, charity, and goodwill toward one’s fellow human beings; and fostering generosity, humility, honesty, and communal concern over individual egotism-these traditionally religious values are most successfully established, institutionalized, and put into practice at the societal level in the most irreligious nations in the world today.”

p. 32 “The United States is arguably the most religious Western democracy. Denmark and Sweden are arguably the least religious Western democracies. Isn’t it strange and rather noteworthy, then, that it is in proudly religious America that guns are plentiful (especially handguns and semiautomatic assault weapons), the penal system is harsh and punitive, the death penalty is meted out on a weekly basis, drug addicts are treated like criminals, millions of children and pregnant mothers lack basic health insurance, millions of elderly people go without proper care, social workers are underpaid and overworked, people suffering from mental illness are left festering on city streets, and the highest levels of poverty of all the industrialized democracies is here. But in relatively irreligious Denmark and Sweden-two nations that most Americans would consider fairly “godless”-guns are nowhere to be found; the penal system is admirably humane, merciful, and rehabilitative; the death penalty has long been abolished; drug addicts are treated as human beings in need of medical and/or psychological treatment; every man, woman, and child has access to excellent health care; the elderly receive the finest care; social workers are well-paid and given manageable case loads; people suffering from mental illness are given first-class treatment; and the country boasts the lowest levels of poverty of all the industrialized democracies. I wondered how and why this is so.”