Ryan, Debi, and Toren Cragun's Blog

Berger, Peter L. 1967. The Social Reality of Religion. New York: Faber and Faber.

Rating:
9

Summary:
Building on his earlier works, “The Sacred Canopy” and “The Social Construction of Reality,” Berger extends his theories about religion by taking a very broad view of religion, from defining it to exploring its past, current, and future states. He notes at the beginning that he is not trying to write a “sociology” of religion, but despite his claim, he touches on key issues that would make up the bulk of such a text – at least from his particular theoretical framework.

The book builds on the notion that religion is a social construction, just like the rest of society. In fact, Berger states this idea rather explicitly, “… the point is that the same human activity that produces society also produces religion, with the relation between the two products always being a dialectical one” (p. 48). What he means here is that society is a social construction that is reified (objectivated) by the shared belief in it. Seldom do people consider that society and reality do not exist apart from the individuals (us) who make it up, but instead act as though society is a tangible, separately existing third party. Berger, who made this point in The Social Construction of Reality with Thomas Luckmann, argues that religion, just like society, is a creation of man, “Put differently, whatever else the constellations of the sacred may be “ultimately,” empirically they are products of human activity and human signification – that is, they are human projections” (p. 89). Berger kind of hedges his bets here – in true agnostic fashion – by saying there may be “something more,” but as understood by a social theorist, religion can only be understood as something created by man.

Having developed this idea, Berger then explores why this understanding has serious portends for religion generally. First, as is the case with any social construction, it is, “… produced and reproduced by man. Its structures are, therefore, inherently precarious and predestined to change” (p. 6). This means religion, like other social constructions, is in a tenuous position in that the legitimations for it must continuously be reinforced. Even so, religion, unlike other social constructs, has found certain ways to bolster this tenuous position. For instance, socialization functions to internalize the objectivated social world, “Socialization achieves success to the degree that this taken-for-granted quality is internalized. It is not enough that the individual look upon the key meanings of the social order as useful, desirable, or right. It is much better (better, that is, in terms of social stability) if he looks upon them as inevitable, as part and parcel of the universal “nature of things”” (p. 24). In other words, socialization is most effective if people are unaware of the fact that they have been socialized. Once people become aware of the fact that socialization is a process by which the rules of group membership are taught (be it a poker club or living in U.S. society), they can question those rules and the process. A good example of this is the political situation in modern China. The Chinese government doesn’t want its citizenship to learn more about democracy because, if it can socialize its citizens into a particularly nomos (or worldview), the people will not only not question the existing system but not realize that they should question the structures of their society (however futile that struggle may be with the internet today).

Berger illustrates that religions are very good at socializing adherents. But, in addition to socialization, religions have another tool: alienation. While it is unfortunate that Berger uses this term differently than Karl Marx did (possibly leading to confusion), his application of the idea is quite brilliant. Berger argues that one of the best ways to legitimate an objectified (or socially constructed) world is to “[immunize] them against the innumerable contingencies of the human enterprise of world-building” (p. 87). This effectively creates, “The world as an opus alienum (of the gods, of nature, of the forces of history, or what not) [that] is seemingly everlasting” (p. 87). In other words, by using legitimations that are unfalsifiable and beyond the scope of scientific inquiry, the powers that be are able to create legitimations of the objectified world that prevent them from being questioned. For example, the classic rationale that “god told me to do it” is difficult to debate because god is a referent to an unknown and unknowable force outside the realm of naturalistic science. The use of such a legitimation results in a nomos that is incredibly difficult to disrupt. As this relates to religions, Berger argues that, “… religion has been one of the most effective bulwarks against anomy throughout human history. It is now important to see that this very fact is directly related to the alienating propensity of religion. Religion has been so powerful an agency of nomization precisely because it has also been a powerful, probably the most powerful, agency of alienation.” (p. 87).

Having developed his arguments concerning the nature of religion, Berger then moves to changes in religion over time. He points out that the formal organization of Christianity (as Catholicism initially, but then with the Protestant Reformation) actually started the process of secularization (which is the separation of things from religion). I had never considered that the organization of the Catholic Church as an institution separate from other institutions was actually the beginning of secularization in that religion now had an exclusive position in society and did not permeate all of society. Berger argues that this was one of the first steps. With the Protestant Reformation and the advent of capitalist economic systems, secularization was furthered by introducing religious pluralism. As Berger ultimately argues, religions cease to be mysterious and sacred (in the Durkheimian sense) once pluralism becomes a factor (pluralism being the legal co-existence of different religious groups in a single society). Once pluralism takes hold, “… the religious ex-monopolies can no longer take for granted the allegiance of their client populations. Allegiance is voluntary and thus, by definition, less than certain. As a result, the religious tradition, which previously could be authoritatively imposed, now has to be marketed. It must be “sold” to a clientele that is no longer constrained to “buy.” The pluralistic situation is, above all, a market situation. What happens here, quite simply, is that the religious groups are transformed from monopolies to competitive marketing agencies” (p. 137).

Ultimately, religious pluralism returns Berger’s discussion full circle to the nature of religion, “… the demenopolization of religion is a social-structural as well as a social-psychological process. Religion no longer legitimates “the world.” Rather, different religious groups seek, by different means, to maintain their particular subworlds in the face of a plurality of competing subworlds. Concomitantly, this plurality of religious legitimations is internalized in consciousness as a plurality of possibilities between which one may choose. Ipso facto, any particular choice is relativized and less than certain. What certainty there is must be dredged up from within the subjective consciousness of the individual, since it can no longer be derived from the external, socially shared and taken-for-granted world”(p. 152). This also ties this book into Berger’s earlier book, The Sacred Canopy, in which he argues that in order for religions to continue to exist they need to maintain “plausibility structures” that reinforce the objectified nomos of the individual. Without strong plausibility structures, such worlds collapse, leading to personal-level secularization (or religious switching).

Included in this rather erudite discussion of the sociology of religion are several chapters on theology that read very much like Greek to me. I’ll touch on those chapters a bit more below, but they seem to be included more because of Berger’s personal interest in theology than to bolster the arguments he develops in this text.

Review:
My only complaint with this book is that it includes several chapters and appendices on theology that, while I probably should be familiar with them, were completely foreign to me. Perhaps I will eventually pick up the ideas of Christian theology as I read more and more books that touch on it here and there (the names are starting to sound familiar now), but it just isn’t my cup of tea at this point. I could also potentially argue that the author doesn’t clearly lay out where he is going with this book from the beginning, but then, as is the case with most of Berger’s books, the style of writing and depth of thought are so complex that he may have done so and I just missed it. But that is a minor point.

All in all, I think this is a brilliantly insightful book that takes two of Berger’s earlier ideas, the social construction of reality and plausibility structures, and applies them to a historical and theoretical understanding of religion. I’m actually amazed this book isn’t referenced more by sociologists of religion as it makes so many good points and develops such clear theories. Perhaps I’ve just been reading the wrong papers, but I’m certainly going to keep my eyes peeled for references to it now.

In addition to developing some profound theories of religion (all outlined above), this book develops some theories that secular critics of religion would likely find useful. For instance, Berger develops a clear explanation for why religion has so often played a role in legitimating violence, “Killing under the auspices of the legitimate authorities has, for this reason, been accompanied from ancient times to today by religious paraphernalia and ritualism. Men go to war and men are put to death amid prayers, blessings, and incantations. The ecstasies of fear and violence are, by these means, kept within the bounds of “sanity,” that is, of the reality of the social world”(p. 45). In other words, religious legitimations of violence make it okay, even though it clearly is not in other circumstances.

Another clear example of the function of religion is detailed in a hypothetical scenario that I found particularly insightful and relate here in its entirety for your reading pleasure, “If one imagines oneself as a fully aware founder of a society, a kind of combination of Moses and Machiavelli, one could ask oneself the following question: How can the future continuation of the institutional order, now established ex nihilo, be best ensured? There is an obvious answer to the question in terms of power. But let it be assumed that all the means of power have been effectively employed – all opponents have been destroyed, all means of coercion are in one’s own hands, reasonably safe provisions have been made for the transmission of power to one’s designated successors. There still remains the problem of legitimation, all the more urgent because of the novelty and thus highly conscious precariousness of the new order. The problem would best be solved by applying the following recipe: Let the institutional order be so interpreted as to hide, as much as possible, its constructed character. Let that which has been stamped out of the ground ex nihilo appear as the manifestation of something that has been existent from the beginning of time, or at least from the beginning of this group. Let the people forget that this order was established by men and continues to be dependent upon the consent of men. Let them believe that, in acting out the institutional programs that have been imposed upon them, they are but realizing the deepest aspirations of their own being and putting themselves in harmony with the fundamental order of the universe. In sum: Set up religious legitimations” (p. 33). Brilliant!

Overall, this book is a must read for anyone interested in the theory behind religions and their origins. Why this book is not more popular among sociologists of religion, I’m not certain (it could be the theology stuff!). But it should be more popular. Oh, and if you’re wholly uninterested in the social construction of reality and the origins of religion, well, you can skip this book.

Vance, Jack. 1966. The Last Castle. ACE.

Rating:
10

Summary:
Great science fiction novel!

A group of humans have returned to Earth after years of space exploration and established a number of settlements. The settlements are castles and are inhabited by five species. First are the lords who are the humans that have returned from the space exploration. The lords are very well educated, but absolutely refuse to do any sort of manual labor. Second are the peasants, who are also humans (or at least human-like; I think it is talked about in the book, but my memory is failing me). The peasants do some manual labor, but the labor they do is limited to food production and preparation. Third is an alien raced called the Meks. The Meks have been trained to do all of the technical manual labor, including the maintenance of all of the machines used by the lords. They stick around because the lords have developed a syrup that the Meks consume for food. Fourth are the phanes, who are also an alien life form. There only function is to look pretty; in fact, they can’t even function as sexual slaves because it ruins their looks and would reveal that they are being used in such a fashion, which is unthinkable to the lords. In short, they are the lord’s pets and they are even paraded about in fashion shows. Finally there are the Birds. Vance’s description gives the impression of a sort of pterodactyl type creature, but they are intelligent enough to talk. They also consume a syrup type substance created by the lords and, for that reason, they stick around.

Additionally, there are some humans that live outside of the castles. These humans are made up of two groups. The majority are humans that survived the devastation wreaked on Earth thousands of years earlier that forced humanity to flee. The rest are peasants that have tired of working for the lords. They are primarily nomadic and don’t have much technology.

The lords spend most of their days acting like nobility – they eat, drink, study, and enjoy art and shows. They do no work and their primary concerns are their phane pets and their sexual partners. Occasionally they will go hunting, but that is only interesting for some of the lords.

Everything seems perfect, to the lords, until… The Meks decide one day to walk out. But this isn’t an ordinary protest, the Meks have something different in mind. The Meks then began sacking the castles, killing all of the inhabitants. It is eventually revealed that the Meks have decided they are tired of serving the lords, but instead of asking the lords to return them to their planet (which wouldn’t be very likely), the Meks decide they like Earth better, so in order for them to have it to themselves, they have decided to kill all the humans.

Well, most of the castles fall relatively quickly. Castle Janeil, the second to last castle, is well-fortified, but the Meks figure out how to destroy it too and that is how the book opens. The Last Castle, Castle Hagedorn, is the most well-fortified and the inhabitants are fairly certain the Meks cannot defeat them. In fact, they are so certain that they have nothing to worry about that they don’t actually do anything to prepare for the attack, with the exception of two of the lords, Xanten and Claghorn, who leave the castle and join the humans outside. The rest of the lords of Castle Hagedorn continue on as if nothing is amiss. They complain that they have to do certain things for themselves, but they will not demean themselves to the point of doing manual labor or anything else to defend themselves. They are so prideful that they would rather die than take up tools or arms, which they see as beneath them.

Eventually the Meks arrive at Castle Hagedorn with an ingenious plan for destroying the castle. The inhabitants haven’t a chance, but the humans that live outside the castle, led by Xanten and Claghorn, come to their rescue and begin attacking the Meks. The outsiders quickly route the majority of the Meks, but the Meks surprise them by tunneling into the castle. Once inside, the Meks fortify the castle and kill the rest of the lords inside, showing no mercy. However, the outsider humans have destroyed all of the Meks syrup and the means for producing more, which means the Meks, who are well fortified, have no means of making food. They will eventually starve.

In the end, the Meks are forced to surrender, but they are surrendering to humans that are willing to do manual labor. They make an agreement: the Meks teach the humans how to do all of the technical manual labor and the humans will return the Meks to their planet.

Review:
This is the second Jack Vance book I have read. Coming away from it, I am absolutely convinced that Vance is two things: 1. A great writer. 2. A hater of the wealthy. And boy does he attack the rich in this novel!!

The entire book is a commentary on social structure. He points out all of the silly peculiarities of the wealthy and their distaste for manual labor. He decries their willingness to demean others so they don’t have to get their hands dirty. He mocks their proxy shows of beauty via their pets (the phanes). He points out the theft of the poor culture by the wealthy (the lords visit the peasant dances and festivals). He even points out how ridiculous it is to spend your life accumulating knowledge if you are unwilling to do anything with that knowledge. This is an all-out attack on the bourgeoisie. And, frankly, I loved it.

But in addition to the commentary about the wealthy, Vance shares a number of profound insights. For instance, he notes that it doesn’t really pay to be prideful, and uses the cowardly birds to make this point, “Of all those who had inhabited Janeil, only the Birds survived, creatures awkward, gauche and raucous, oblivious to pride and faith, more concerned with the wholeness of their hides than the dignity of their castle” (p. 2). He also discusses morality and provides a basis for morals that has nothing to do with religion, “But the ultimate basis of morality is survival. What promotes survival is good, what induces mortifaction is bad” (p. 51).

But the most amazing part about this book is that he accomplishes all of this in less than 115 pages. The book is a short read, less than two hours, but it is very engaging, with great imagery and poignant philosophy. I highly recommend this book for everyone, including the bourgeoisie whom Vance is criticizing. Finally, I think I should point out one more time that it is likely Vance’s criticisms of the accumulation of wealth and the lifestyles of the bourgeoisie that have resulted in the lack of interest in his writing here in the U.S. but the high interest in Europe.

Hofstadter, Richard. 1962. Anti-Intellectualism in American Life. New York,: Vintage Books.

Rating:
8

Summary:
detailed history of anti-intellectualism, mostly history

The author begins the book by illustrating some of the anti-intellectual trends and events taking place while he was writing it (1950s and 1960s). Some of the trends are particularly shocking, some are rooted in McCarthy’s intellectual witchhunts (disguised as ‘rooting out communism’; see p. 3), and some are relatively commonplace. The author then proceeds to explore the roots of American anti-intellectualism, situating it in several things: (1) religious revivals and the move toward religious evangelicalism and fundamentalism in the U.S. beginning in the 18th century; (2) changes in the leadership of the country favoring businessmen and western colonizers who were non-intellectuals (p. 48; p. 233); and (3) the self-ostracization of intellectuals due to the above pressures and their desire not to be associated with such types. This is, of necessity, a very rough summary of the primary points made in this 400+ page, dense book.

After explaining the origins of anti-intellectualism, the author then analyzes some specific components of society (business and education) and examines the anti-intellectual trends that run through them.

The author concludes by illustrating that, despite a continued pervasive anti-intellectualism in American life, intellectuals have made something of a resurgence due to their professionalization (they control the universities and some other professions) and due to the ever increasing complexity of society. Because society is so complex, intellectuals are now necessary to both understand it and do what they can to control and contribute to it. Of course, the fact that intellectuals are now necessary has also worked against them inasmuch as the non-intellectual sees them as a threat to their livelihood (p. 34), but societal complexity has nevertheless functioned to reinvigorate the roles of intellectuals.

Review:
First, let me just say that I have only very minor criticisms of this book. It is well-written, well-researched, and very informative. Many of the criticisms I have stem from the fact that I am a sociologist and not a historian.

The first criticism is rooted in this distinction – as a sociologist, I kept wanting survey data illustrating the anti-intellectualism of U.S. society or some other social-scientific data. Unfortunately, that data never surfaced, even though the author quite regularly quoted sociologists. Perhaps some sociological research has followed up on the conclusions and assertions of this book and examined some of these issues, but I am not familiar with it.

Also as a sociologist, at times I felt the book went into too much historical detail. This also occasionally resulted in a sense that the history was presented just because the author had researched it and not because it strengthened the author’s arguments. This seemed particularly true in the chapters examining anti-intellectualism in specific areas (business and education) as well as the histories of specific denominations.

My final criticism is that the author is an intellectual (he’s a history PhD employed primarily at academic institutions) writing about anti-intellectualism; undoubtedly he is going to have a bias. Admittedly, the author does a pretty good job being objective, but as an intellectual myself (a rather elitist assertion, I know), I probably overlooked any subtle pro-intellectual bias.

Other than these minor critiques, I have only praise for this book. The author points out part of the reason why our public school system is as poor as it is – lots of anti-intellectualism that has resulted in the lowering of academic standards. The author phrases it thus, “Formerly, it had been held that a liberal academic education was good for all pupils. Now it was argued that all pupils should in large measure get the kind of training originally conceived for the slow learner” (pp. 352-353). What makes assertions like this one particular disturbing is the fact that it still holds true 40+ years after this book was written.

The book also makes an interesting assertion about the importance of military service (or athletic participation) for political candidates, “It was assumed that a major part of civic character resides in military virtue; even today an intellectual in politics can sometimes counteract the handicap of intellect by pointing to a record of military service” (p. 148). For those wondering why John Kerry’s military service is being played up as much as it is, this should help explain it; Kerry is an intellectual and emphasizing his military service increases his appeal among the non-intellectuals.

Overall, though the book is now over 40 years old and somewhat dated, I would still recommend it for anyone interested in intellectuals and anti-intellectualism in America. You’ll need quite a bit of time to wade through the rather dense writing, but at times the writing is so brilliant that it more than makes up for the periodic lapses into rote history. The author is also particularly insightful given the lack of social scientific data on this topic. This is a very informative and enlightening book.

McLoughlin, Emmett. 1962. Crime & Immorality in the Catholic Church. New York: Lyle Stuart, Inc. 1962.

Rating:
0

Introduction:
I picked this book up years ago when I was a faithful Mormon. I think I found it in a used bookstore in Morgan, UT. I had the impression that it would be a well-documented book detailing some of the crimes and atrocities committed in the name of Catholicism over the centuries. I was wrong.

Review:
This is a hate book, written by a former priest who converted to Protestantism. And rather than document atrocities in history, the focus of this book is to claim that Roman Catholicism does not inspire morality in its members, “[Religion's] most important product—its reason for existence—is morality, the molding of lives that are not only good, but better than others, with a greater assurance than that of other religions that its members will be far less sinful, much better emotionally adjusted throughout life and thus more certain of eternal happiness in heaven. The purpose of this book is to show that the Roman Catholic Church in its most important work is a failure. Among its members crime and immorality are greater than among the unchurched or the members of other churches” (p. 17). Not only does the author not have any good, authoritative sources to indicate crime rates are higher among Catholics, but his very premise is a logical fallacy – a strawman. He is setting up an argument that is not true and not claimed by Catholicism. The purpose Catholicism claims is to spread its believed truth about the fallen nature of man and Jesus Christ’s atonement. Morality may play a role in that, but it is not the sole reason of existence of religion. Anyone who thinks that religion exists solely to maintain morality is missing the much bigger picture. Yes, from a functionalist perspective in sociology some scholars have made the argument that religion codifies and reinforces morality in society. But that is really not why religion exists. Claiming that is the purpose of religion then showing that one has fallen short in achieving that end is a strawman argument – it is not a logically defensible position.

If you don’t accept Catholicisms manifest reason for existence (which you probably should not accept) – to spread the message of Christ – the latent (and real) reason is still not morality maintenance, but rather its continued existence. As Dawkins argues in his discussions of religion (pick any of his books as a reference), religion is a meme, and the purpose of a meme is self-replication, not societal betterment. Ergo, if a side effect of that meme is that it increases morality in such a fashion that it improves the spread of the meme, than the meme will be more successful than other memes, but that is not the purpose of the meme. The purpose of the meme is self-replication, nothing more.

So, having illustrated that the primary purpose of the book is, in fact, a logical fallacy, now let me turn to the approach. The author loves to say things like, “In the rich soil of freedom of thought and worship prepared and preserved by Protestantism and Freemasonry…” (p. 14). I may not be a genius, but I don’t think it takes one to see where this book is going. The author is a Protestant and a Freemason and is claiming those groups do inspire good morals but Catholics don’t. Not a strong basis for his argument. If he derives his morals from the Bible, one of the most immoral books still in publication, he is at best a hypocrite and at worst just naive. Here’s another example of his biased, indefensible, and hypocritical position, “Because I believe in spiritual and religious liberty I have become a Protestant” (p. 25). As though those two must go together…

Perhaps in recognition of the shaky ground he is on arguing from a Protestant perspective, the author goes so far as to insinuate that Catholicism may not even be a religion, “He might become rather cynical and wonder if Roman Catholicism be really a religion at all, or whether it is perhaps some less noble enterprise cleverly disguised under the masquerade of religion” (pp. 17-18). You can’t very well consider Catholicism a religion if you are claiming religion is all about morality and you are still religious. It kind of taints the whole boat of religions. So, rather than taint his religious position by allowing Catholicism to remain a member of the group he implies that Catholicism is something other than a religion.

The author does claim that Roman Catholics are disproportionately represented among prison convicts, but the source of his data is sketchy. He also says things like, “Illiterates are generally criminally inclined” (p. 35), which just left me with a sour taste in my mouth. Come page 40 and I put the book down. I have better things to do with my time.

So, maybe if you’re a dyed-in-the-wool, Catholic hating Protestant and Freemason you’ll like this book. That would be especially true if you don’t care about logical fallacies or other poor arguments or lack of data. But if you are looking for a historical book on the atrocities in Catholic history, this isn’t the book for you… Look elsewhere.

Goffman, Erving. 1961. Asylums. New York: Anchor Books.

Rating:
10

Summary:
The definitive sociological treatise of total institutions

The contents of this book are really far too complex to summarize, but I will do my best. There are two major points made in this text. The first is the development of the concept of the total institution. Goffman gives the following characteristics of total institutions: (1) all aspects of life are conducted in the same place under the same authority; (2) the individual is a member of a large cohort, all treated alike; (3) all daily activities (over a 24-hour period) are tightly scheduled; (4) there is a sharp split between supervisors and lower participants; (5) information about the member’s fate is withheld. (p. 6) The basic examples of total institutions are mental hospitals, prisons, and military boot camps, though there are numerous other institutions that could be considered total institutions as well. Goffman doesn’t leave his discussion of total institutions at a simple definition, he also describes nearly every aspect of total institutions, focusing primarily on the life of the inmates of the institutions (he also discusses the roles of the staff, but that isn’t really the focus) and the effects of the institutional environment on the selves and identities of the inmates.

The second major point in the text is Goffman’s criticism of total institutions, which is really limited to the very last section in the book (though you could easily see an underlying criticism throughout). Goffman’s basic argument is that the total institution does several things to inmates (I should note that he is speaking specifically of mental hospitals here, though some of this could likely be applied to other institutions): First it stigmatizes the inmate, preventing them from being able to ever completely reintegrate into society afterwards. Second, it forces a ‘sick’ identity on the inmate. For some inmates, any problems or disorders they may (or may not) have are actually encouraged and/or emphasized in mental hospitals because of the culture and environment inside. In a sense Goffman is actually arguing that total institutions create more problems then they solve by turning relatively normal people into mentally unhealthy people (a good fictitious example of this would be One Flew Over the Cuckoo’s Nest).

Goffman’s basis for his discussion and analysis is a period of time he spent in a mental hospital. As an academic work, the book is also filled with references to previous literature and explanatory notes.

Review:
I was actually introduced to Goffman in an advanced social theory course but it wasn’t until I thought about applying the concept of total institutions to one of the institutions with which I am familiar that I actually read the book. In researching the topic it appears that very little work has actually been done on total institutions (labeled as such) since Goffman’s treatise (a lot of work has been done on prisons but it is in the criminology literature and does not generally refer to prisons as total institutions). I did find several examples of papers applying this Weberian ‘ideal type’ to different institutions, including: Indian Reservations, Graduate School, and others.

I think the reason why there is so little work following Goffman’s treatise is because he is generally right, very clear, and remarkably insightful. If he has pushed the concept to its limits then there really isn’t any point in trying to push it any further. In this sense, this book is comprehensive and very, very insightful.

But one of my reviews would not be complete without a criticism or two. The only real criticisms I have are the length of the book and the organization. The book is very long and, despite using a surprisingly large font, it takes quite a while to dig through the entire thing. There is quite of bit of information that could potentially have been left out, but if he had, perhaps this wouldn’t be the masterpiece it generally is considered to be. Also, and Goffman recognizes this and apologizes for it in the beginning, the organization is kind of strange. Rather than organizing the book as a book with distinct chapters it is actually just a compilation of 4 papers that he had previously published. Some of the papers are massive (over 100 pages), but the problem is that there isn’t a perfectly clear logic to the organization and there is absolutely no transition from one chapter/paper to the next. This really is forgivable as an academic work, but it does make things a bit awkward for the reader.

Overall this book is superb. Not only is it well-written (though perhaps at a rather advanced level) but it is incredibly insightful. Obviously Goffman caught the essence of the concept because no one has really challenged his understandings since. If you are looking for the sociological Symbolic Interactionist perspective on total institutions (mental hospitals specifically) or are just interested in what mental hospitals are really like (though this book is likely a bit dated), then look no further than Asylums. I highly recommend this for anyone interested in these topics.