Ryan and Debi Cragun’s Blog

Title:
Norris, Pippa, and Ronald Inglehart. 2004. Sacred and Secular: Religion and Politics Worldwide. Cambridge University Press.

Rating:
10

Review:
A long-standing theory in the sociology of religion, secularization, suggests that, as societies modernize, they will also grow more secular. Many scholars have found support for this argument, but there are some countries that serve as exceptions. The most obvious one is the U.S., though how much of an exception it is is hotly debated. The U.S., of course, is a pretty developed country, yet levels of religiosity (in particular, belief in some form of god and levels of religious affiliation), remain fairly high (about 60% of Americans believe in a personal god; another 30% believe in some other form of god or aren’t sure; less than 10% are atheists and agnostics). So, the primary questions Norris and Inglehart are trying to address is: Does secularization result from modernization? And, if so, how do you explain exceptions to the rule?

Keep in mind that most other developed countries around the world (pretty much all of Western Europe, Australia, New Zealand, Japan, etc.) are pretty secular, while undeveloped countries tend to be fairly religious. That, alone, suggests support for the theory of secularization. But critics of the theory point to countries like the U.S. (and Poland and Ireland, the other two classic exceptions) and say, “But these are developed countries. Why aren’t they as secular?” Well, the U.S. is a lot more secular than, say, Afghanistan, where 100% believe in a god and everyone has a religious affiliation (within rounding error). Previous scholars have suggested modifications to the theory of secularization. Mark Chaves suggested we should understand secularization as “declining religious authority,” not just reductions in the classic indicators of religiosity – belief in god, attendance, and religious affiliation. If you look at secularization as declining religious authority, it’s pretty clear that religions have lost a lot of their ability to dictate beliefs and behaviors to their followers (e.g. over 60% of Catholics in the U.S. use birth control and want women to be ordained priests; clearly the authority of the Roman Catholic Church has declined). Steve Bruce has also argued that secularization can be seen in the changing nature of religion in the U.S.: religion is becoming more “this-worldly” rather than “other-worldly,” meaning it is increasingly similar to pop-psychology and includes watered-down theology with virtually no mention of hellfire and damnation. Both Chaves and Bruce are correct: religions are losing authority and changing to accommodate the broader secular culture.

But Norris and Inglehart suggest another modification. They argue that it isn’t necessarily modernization that leads to secularization, but rather “existential security”: the feeling that survival is secure enough that it can be taken for granted, “We believe that the importance of religiosity persists most strongly among vulnerable populations, especially those living in poorer nations, facing personal survival-threatening risks” (p. 2). As they understand it, those without existential security are experiencing significant levels of stress. “Individuals experiencing stress have a need for rigid, predictable rules. They need to be sure of what is going to happen because they are in danger - their margin for error is slender and they need maximum predictability. Conversely, people raised under conditions of relative security can tolerate more ambiguity and have less need for the absolute and rigidly predictable rules that religious sanctions provide. People with relatively high levels of existential security can more readily accept deviations from familiar patterns than people who feel anxiety concerning their basic existential needs. In economically secure industrial societies, with an established basic safety-net safeguarding against the risks of absolute poverty and a relatively egalitarian distribution of household incomes, an increasing sense of safety brings a diminishing need for absolute rules, which contributes to the decline of traditional religious norms” (p. 13). In short, it isn’t modernization that leads to declines in religiosity; it’s existential security, which often (but not always) comes with societal modernization.

In addition to testing this hypothesis about secularization, the authors also examine a variety of other hypotheses, but they are more tangential to the main argument of the book. Norris and Inglehart suggest that cultural differences will result in slightly different trajectories for different countries (in particular, differences in culture between Protestant, Catholic, and Muslim countries will all effect secularization trajectories). They also suggest that the greatest declines in religious behavior will occur in countries where the importance of religion has declined the most (this is a less than compelling causal argument as it’s virtually impossible to say that one of these causes the other or vice versa). The authors also look at the ramifications of declining religiosity on civic engagement, suggesting, like Robert Putnam does, that higher levels of religiosity increase one’s involvement in the local community. They also suggest that different cultural traditions will influence other societal values, like work ethic. Finally, the authors suggest that modernized countries will continue to become more secular, but the overall levels of religiosity around the world will continue to rise as the most rapidly growing populations are also the populations with the highest levels of religiosity – they are also the least existentially secure.

The bulk of the data the authors use to test these hypotheses comes from the World Values Survey. They combine that data with other data where necessary.

What do they find? They find support for all of their hypotheses, “Due to rising levels of human security, the publics of virtually all advanced industrial societies have been moving toward more secular orientations… Due to demographic trends in poorer societies, the world as a whole now has more people with traditional religious views than ever before - and they constitute a growing proportion of the world’s population… [And] the expanding gap between the sacred and the secular societies around the globe will have important consequences for world politics, raising the role of religion on the international agenda” (p. 19). Remarkably, their statistical models are able to account for 66% of the variation in religious behavior between countries. As social science goes, that’s pretty remarkable.

Turning to some specific findings… How do the authors address the issue of the U.S. remaining somewhat more religious than is expected? First, they note that the U.S. is something of an exception when it comes to the relationship between economic development and secularization, but they also offer an explanation: the level of inequality in the U.S. is really high. There are lots of rich people, but there are also lots of poor people in the U.S. - lots of them! Poor people, regardless of their society, tend to be more attracted to religion’s promises as it provides the existential security they lack. Thus, it is the high levels of inequality in the U.S. that explain the continued religiosity. The explanation offered by scholars like Rodney Stark and Roger Finke – that it’s the high levels of religious pluralism in the U.S. that leads to higher levels of religiosity – is not supported in their data. In fact, they find just the opposite – countries with greater levels of religious pluralism tend to have lower levels of religiosity, while more monopolistic countries tend to have higher levels of religiosity. Additionally, there is not a significant relationship between religious freedom and levels of religious behavior (which refutes Grim and Finke 2006).

Norris and Inglehart also examine religiosity in former soviet countries, which has also been a question of interest in the sociology of religion. Some scholars have claimed that there has been a resurgence of religiosity since the fall of the Soviet Union (see Greeley’s work). The authors of the book note that it is difficult to say for certain whether or not there has been a resurgence since there is no good religiosity data on former soviet countries prior to the 1990s. But their analysis suggests a linear relationship between age and religiosity: older people are more religious; younger people are less religious. Ergo, no resurgence of religiosity in former soviet countries. There is some renewed interest in Orthodox religions and New Age religions, but not enough to offset declines.

Another intriguing finding has to do with some of the other norms and values that differ between countries with different cultures. There are no differences between predominantly Muslim countries and Western, more democratic countries in their support for democracy, democratic ideals, and strong leadership. However, Muslims do show greater support for a strong societal role by religious authorities. But the biggest differences are on gender equality and sexual liberalization. Muslim countries are substantially more oppositional to gender equality and greater sexual liberalization. Ironically, though, Muslim countries show a greater work ethic, greater even than Protestant countries, which Max Weber claimed had the highest work ethic resulting from capitalism (also note that Protestant countries score lower than Catholic countries). If it was true at some point that Protestants had a higher work ethic, it is no longer true. As Protestant countries tend to be post-industrial, they tend to place greater value on leisure, relaxation, and self-fulfillment outside of employment. In fact, level of development is a better predictor of attitudes toward wok than is religion. Additionally, Protestant countries are not the most ethical in their moral views and they are not the most fundamentalist on moral life issues like abortion or euthanasia. Economic development is actually a better predictor of fundamentalist views on those issues; less developed countries have more fundamentalist views.

There are a few problems with the book, but nothing major. The biggest problem I observed was that the organization of the book wasn’t perfectly clear and the authors had a tendency to both jump around from topic to topic and repeat themselves at times. This may have resulted from the broad range of ideas they were examining, but it did make the book more difficult to read than it needed to be. That said, the writing is quite lucid and clear when the organization makes sense.

Overall, this is an extremely compelling argument in favor of secularization theory, though modified to understand the driving force as increasing existential security. The authors bring an overwhelming body of data to the debate and address a number of hypotheses, perhaps a few too many, but this book will definitely serve as a foundational resource for future debates over secularization.

(Note: Most of this book is available online for free: http://www.pippanorris.com/)

I’ve had this for over a month and keep forgetting to post it.  It’s a short recording I made of Dariposa’s heartbeat during the last ultrasound.  It’s kind of hard to hear, but it really is a heartbeat, as heard through the ultrasound’s microphone:

heartbeat

Here’s another report I ended up putting together recently because I was interested in domestic partner benefits:

Summary Report on Domestic Partner Benefits (DPBs)
Ryan T. Cragun
Assistant Professor of Sociology

Definition

• domestic partners are non-blood relatives who share the same residence, intend to do so indefinitely, are not currently married to someone else, who consider themselves jointly responsible for the welfare of each other, and are each others’ only domestic partner (Flynn 1998; Mackey 1994)
• many companies require an affidavit of spousal equivalency and a 6-month waiting period after a break up (Flynn 1998; Mackey 1994)
• domestic partners are often required to show proof of a shared material life, e.g., shared bank accounts, leases, etc. (Badgett 2000)

Cost Issues

• domestic-partner benefits usually cost between 1% and 3% of the overall cost of the benefits package; i.e., the costs go up by 1% of the total prior to adding domestic partner benefits (Bull 2000; Flynn 1998; Goldblatt 1994; Henneman 2005; Kiger 2004; Liebeskind 2000; Shinkman 1997; Badgett 2000; Human Rights Campaign Foundation 2007)
• 56% of employers saw a 1% or smaller increase in enrollment; 19% saw a 2% enrollment rate or lower for domestic partners (Badgett 2000)
• National Collegiate Athletic Association added domestic partner benefits at a cost of $10,000 per year, out of a total health care budget of $2.9 million (Klineman 2004)
• cost is still less than 3% when opposite-sex domestic partners are added (Klineman 2004; Badgett 2000); average is 2.1% for both same and opposite sex, .4% for same-sex only (Badgett 2000)
• same-sex couples are less likely to use domestic partner benefits than married couples as partners are more likely to work and receive benefits at their own jobs, making the cost even less than that for married couples (Mackey 1994; Badgett 2000)
• up to 40% of an employee’s compensation is benefits; if someone is denied those benefits, they are essentially taking a 10% pay cut (Adams 2002; Steward 2003)
• 2.5% of men and 1.4% of women are homosexual; the “take-up” rate of employees (the percentage of a companies employees that would actually use the benefits) would be around 1.4% (Gates 2001)
• health insurance companies claim the cost to them for adding domestic partners is next to nothing as the rate of adoption is so low (Goldblatt 1994)
• concern over HIV/AIDS is negligible as few people with AIDS end up on the rolls and the costs of complicated pregnancies and births are far more expensive (Klineman 2004; Mackey 1994; Badgett 2000)
• hiring a new employee costs between $3,310 and $6,359; losing a worker of ten years costs about $3,000 in training; combined, these two expenses offset the cost of offering domestic partner benefits (Badgett 2000)

Legal Issues

• federal law makes domestic partner benefits difficult to provide; The Defense of Marriage Act states for purposes of federal law, the word “marriage” means only the legal union between a man and a woman as husband and wife. The word “spouse” refers only to a person of the opposite sex who is a husband or wife. (Flynn 1998)
• the federal tax code doesn’t recognize domestic partners as beneficiaries of retirement plans (Flynn 1998; The Advocate 2007; Human Rights Campaign Foundation 2007)
• IRS ruled that domestic partner benefits were taxable benefits unless the domestic partner qualifies as a dependent of the employee (Flynn 1998; Kapp and Burkholder 2008; Klineman 2004; Mackey 1994; Human Rights Campaign Foundation 2007)
• same-sex domestic partners cannot file taxes jointly, like a married couple, which may increase their tax burden (Human Rights Campaign Foundation 2007)
• Issues Resulting from Anti-Gay Amendments:
  • Michigan universities found a way around offering domestic partner benefits when a state law prohibited gay marriage (Bradley 2007; Levinson 2007)
  • Miami University (in Ohio) was sued for offering same-sex domestic partner benefits after Ohio passed an anti-gay marriage amendment, but the case was thrown out of court and has not been attempted again (Shuppy 2006)
• Issues in Tampa:
  • July 6th, 2001, a lesbian police officer in Tampa was shot and killed; her partner was denied rights, initially, because of Tampa law at the time (Bull 2001)
  • as of 2004, the city of Tampa offers domestic partner benefits to both same-sex and oppositesex couples (Varian 2004)
• Gay-Friendly Court Decisions
  • Montana’s state university system has to offer same-sex domestic partner benefits if it offers opposite-sex domestic partner benefits (Bradley 2005)

Business Benefits

• companies see domestic partner benefits as a way of recruiting some of the best employees in a highly competitive job market (Bull 2000; Flynn 1998; Henneman 2005; Joslyn 2008; Kiger 2004; Mackey 1994); this is also true of universities (Goral 2006)
• many nongay employees are asking about how gay and single people are treated; they don’t want to work in a stressful environment (Bull 2000; Kiger 2004)
• heterosexual employees use the presence or absence of domestic partner benefits as a barometer for diversity (Henneman 2005; Kiger 2004)
• Ottaway Newspapers Inc. (the Dow Jones & Co. Inc. subsidiary that owns the Standard-Times) granted domestic partner benefits in 2001 because it is (1) the right thing to do morally, and (2) good business sense as it helps in hiring and retention (De La Harpe 2000; Liebeskind 2000)
• domestic partner benefits reinforce a companies’ policy of nondiscrimination by illustrating that the company’s deeds match its rhetoric (Flynn 1998; Goldblatt 1994; Kiger 2004; Klineman 2004; Mackey 1994; Badgett 2000)
• domestic partner benefits don’t protect a company from sexual-orientation lawsuits, but they do illustrate that a company is trying to accommodate homosexual individuals and treat them equally, which may reflect favorably if a lawsuit arises (Flynn 1998; Mackey 1994)
• offering domestic partner benefits reduces the tension of not having partners insured and discrimination (Goldblatt 1994)
• at Fortune 100 tech firms, 90% of those polled said domestic partner benefits would increase the likelihood that they will stay at the company (Kiger 2004)
• there is substantial evidence that domestic partner benefits and anti-discrimination laws retain good employees (Henneman and Coleman 2005; Kuhr 2006; Badgett 2000; Human Rights Campaign Foundation 2007)
• nearly 90% of Fortune 500 companies provide workplace protections based on sexual orientation (Human Rights Campaign Foundation 2007)
• Benefits for Universities Specifically:
  • university towns tend to have high concentrations of gays/lesbians (Gates and Ost 2004)
  • business schools are now rated on how gay-friendly they are; top-rated schools include: Harvard, Stanford, Dartmouth, University of Pennsylvania, UCLA, and MIT (Merritt 2003)
  • When the board of trustees at Virginia Tech rejected a contract for a new dean’s lesbian partner without justifiable reason (it appears to have been because she is a lesbian), faculty reported an atmosphere of suspicion and fear and many said they were leaving because of the hostility and discrimination (Steward 2003)
  • gay-friendly policies factor into faculties decisions when looking for schools to apply to (Steward 2003); some faculty leave universities when they do not provide domestic partner benefits (Wilson 2004)

Pervasiveness

• History of DPB in Corporations:
  • first company to offer domestic partner benefits was the Village Voice newspaper in 1982 (Klineman 2004); the first publicly traded company to do so was Lotus, now part of IBM, in 1992 (Kiger 2004; Noble 1992); tech companies were the first to adopt domestic partner benefits (Mackey 1994)
  • in 1990 2 of the Fortune 500 companies offered domestic partner benefits (Henneman 2005; Badgett 2000)
  • in 1994 about 60 companies offered domestic partner benefits (Goldblatt 1994)
  • 1 in 10 large companies offered domestic partner benefits in 1997 (Hayes 1997)
  • 3,400 employers offered benefits in 2000; 1996 it was fewer than 500 (Bull 2000; Badgett 2000)
  • In 2000, 102 of the Fortune 500 companies offered domestic partner benefits (Gates 2001)
  • June 2000 the big three US automakers – GM, Ford, DaimlerChrysler – gave domestic partner benefits to their employees (Gates 2001)
  • in 1994, only 10 media companies offered domestic partner benefits; as of 2000, 69 did, including The St. Petersburg Times in Florida (Liebeskind 2000)
  • in 2004, 8,250 employers offered domestic partner benefits, making up 29% of corporations; 216 of Fortune 500 offered domestic partner benefits (Henneman 2005; Briscoe and Safford 2005)
  • as of 2008, over 50% of Fortune 500 companies offer domestic partner benefits (Joslyn 2008; Weinstein 2007)
  • increase in the number of companies offering the benefits is driven primarily by the strong US economy (Bull 2000)
• History of DPBs in Universities:
  • in 2006, more than 300 institutions of higher education in the US offered domestic partner benefits, out of about 4,000 (Goral 2006; Steward 2003)
  • in 2007, of the Top 125 colleges and universities based on US News and World Reports, 90% offer domestic partner benefits (Human Rights Campaign Foundation 2007)
  • despite being likely to offer domestic partner benefits, universities are still not entirely safe and welcoming places for GLBT students, faculty, and staff (Rankin 2003)
• most health insurance companies offer domestic partner benefits (Goldblatt 1994); there are at least 4 in every state (Klineman 2004); in fact, while they offer domestic partner benefits to be competitive, they don’t see this as a money-maker because so few people buy the plans and they aren’t more expensive than traditional plans (Shinkman 1997)
• over 30% of non-profit organizations offer domestic partner benefits as of 2004 (Joslyn 2008; Klineman 2004)

Discrimination

• Public Opinion:
  • 88% of Americans believe homosexuals should be protected from workplace discrimination (Latellir 2003)
  • 60% of Americans believe same-sex couples should have the same legal rights as married couples (Latellir 2003)
• Discrimination:
  • homosexuals without domestic partner benefits feel like second class citizens: they do the same work as their heterosexual colleagues but do not receive the same benefits (De La Harpe 2000; Wilson 2004)
  • proponents of civil marriage for same-sex couples encourage commitment, stability, and child rearing; denying them the option of marriage and domestic partner benefits amounts to disparate treatment for essentially equal households (Gates and Ost 2004)
  • not offering domestic partner benefits to homosexuals is akin to not offering domestic partner benefits to blacks, women, or Mormons (Goldblatt 1994)
  • 1 in 4 same-sex couples is raising children; have, on average, 2 children per household; denying such families domestic partner benefits is discrimination and endangers the welfare of the children (Gates and Ost 2004)
• Basis for Discrimination is Ideological/Religious:
  • the Salvation Army rescinded benefits to same-sex partners due to criticism from conservative Christians; the Salvation Army now says it will not offer benefits because it is not in line with the Bible, preventing the organization from providing charitable services in cities that require equal benefits; critics consider the organization “antigay”; the Salvation Army also tried to negotiate a deal with the Bush Administration that would keep it from being blacklisted by the government for being a discriminatory organization (Ghent 2001; Gierach 2001)
  • The University of Pittsburgh has not offered domestic partner benefits for fear of offending religiously conservative state legislators and losing state funding; this is not an issue of concern for private universities (Wilson 2004)
  • non-profits that don’t offer domestic partner benefits or that don’t have anti-discrimination policies on sexual identity alienate donors (e.g., the Boy Scouts of America); (Joslyn 2008)
• boycotts by conservative Christians against gay-friendly companies are ineffectual; they do not have the intended effect and die out quickly (Henneman 2005; Kiger 2004; Mackey 1994)

Abuse of Benefits

• In none of the articles I read could I find any discussion of domestic partner benefit abuse. I’m inclined to think this is a canard put forth by critics who oppose domestic partner benefits on ideological or religious grounds and not on any empirical evidence. Because qualification as a domestic partner requires a lengthy, complicated process that includes the provision of evidence, fraud or abuse of such a system is almost guaranteed to be so negligible as to be unworthy of actual discussion (see the section above on definition). This is a disingenuous attempt to undermine efforts at equality.

References
(all available here: )

• Adams, Bob. 2002. “Money.” Advocate 22.
• Badgett, M.V. Lee. 2000. “Calculating Costs with Credibility: Health Care Benefits for Domestic Partners.” Angles: The Policy Journal of the Institute for Gay and Lesbian Strategic Studies 5:8.
• Bradley, Gwendolyn. 2005. “Changes Made to Domestic Partner Benefits.” Academe 91:15-16.
• Bradley, Gwendolyn. 2007. “New Way to Offer Domestic-Partner Benefits.” Academe 93:9.
• Briscoe, Forrest, and Sean Safford. 2005. “Agency in Diffusion: Activism, Imitation and the Adoption of Domestic Partner Benefits Among the Fortune 500..” Pp. 1-22 in. American Sociological Association.
• Bull, Chris. 2000. “Firm Partnerships.” Advocate 66.
• Bull, Chris. 2001. “In the line of fire.” Advocate 14.
• De La Harpe, Jackleen. 2000. “Partner benefits a matter of fairness..” Editor & Publisher 133:14.
• Flynn, Gillian. 1998. “Make your company’s domestic-partner benefits foolproof..” Workforce 77:95.
• Gates, Gary J. 2001. “Domestic Partner Benefits Won’t Break the Bank.” Population Today 29:1.
• Gates, Gary J., and Jason Ost. 2004. “Getting Us Where We Live..” Gay & Lesbian Review Worldwide 11:19-21.
• Ghent, Bill. 2001. “No salvation after all.” Advocate 16.
• Gierach, Ryan. 2001. “Salvation Army Rescinds Domestic Partners Benefits.” Lesbian News 27:17.
• Goldblatt, Henry. 1994. “Out of step with the times..” Human Rights: Journal of the Section of Individual Rights & Responsibilities 21:24-27.
• Goral, Tim. 2006. “Domestic Benefits Ping Pong.” University Business 9:13.
• Hayes, Cassandra. 1997. “Domestic partners benefit..” Black Enterprise 27:75.
• Henneman, Todd. 2005. “Benefits for Gay Partners More Common.” Workforce Management 84:24.
• Henneman, Todd, and Alexsys Coleman. 2005. “Their streets to success.” Advocate 38-45.
• Human Rights Campaign Foundation. 2007. The State of the Workplace: For Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual and Transgender Americans. Washington, DC: Human Rights Campaign Foundation http://www.hrc.org/issues/marriage/domestic_partners/2945.htm (Accessed October 22, 2008).
• Joslyn, Heather. 2008. “Out in the Open.” Chronicle of Philanthropy 20:44.
• Kapp, Joe, and Nicholas Burkholder. 2008. “Uncle Sam Calling.” Advocate 22.
• Kiger, Patrick J. 2004. “A court decision isn’t likely to spur changes in partner benefits..” Workforce Management 83:66-67.
• Klineman, Jeffrey. 2004. “Affirming Domestic Diversity.” Chronicle of Philanthropy 16:45-47.
• Kuhr, Fred. 2006. “Breaking the mold.” Advocate 42-47.
• Latellir, Patrick. 2003. “Tug of War: The Relentless Struggle for Gay Rights in 2003.” Lesbian News 28:36.
• Levinson, Rachel B. 2007. “Michigan Domestic-Partner Benefits Denied.” Academe 93:8.
• Liebeskind, Ken. 2000. “D.J. plans a healthy new year..” Editor & Publisher 133:12.
• Mackey, Aurora. 1994. “Domestic partner benefits are catching on…slowly.” Business & Health 12:73.
• Merritt, Jennifer. 2003. “Gay-Friendly B-Schools.” Business Week 8.
• Noble, Barbara Presley. 1992. “At Work; Benefits for Domestic Partners.” New York Times, June 28, 23.
• Rankin, Susan R. 2003. Campus Climate: For Gay, Lesbian, Bisexual, and Transgender People: A National Perspective. The Policy Institute of the National Gay and Lesbian Task Force http://www.thetaskforce.org/reports_and_research/campus_climate (Accessed October 25, 2008).
• Shinkman, Ron. 1997. “Domestic dispute.” Modern Healthcare 27:40.
• Shuppy, Annie. 2006. “Judge Dismisses Suit Against Partner Benefits..” Chronicle of Higher Education 53:A24.
• Steward, Doug. 2003. “Working Toward Equality.” Academe 89:29.
• The Advocate. 2007. “Your money: Top five financial inequalities for gay couples..” Advocate 20.
• Varian, Bill. 2004. “Hillsborough: Tampa offers benefits to same-sex couples.” St. Petersburg Times, March 12 http://www.sptimes.com/2004/03/12/Hillsborough/Tampa_offers_benefits.shtml (Accessed October 22, 2008).
• Weinstein, Steve. 2007. “Putting their best foot forward..” Advocate 68-70.
• Wilson, Robin. 2004. “Pitt’s Bitter Battle Over Benefits..” Chronicle of Higher Education 50:A8-A10.

PDF copy of the report.

In my Introduction to Sociology class I was discussing the various approaches to health care: private pay/insurance companies vs. single-payer or universal pay (government sponsored). During that discussion one of my students raised an issue that is often raised in this debate. She had heard that because health care is free in Canada, wait times are much, much longer in Canada than they are in the U.S. I responded by saying that they are actually shorter for emergency room visits in Canada, but longer for elective surgeries. She followed up via email and wanted some references and more information (it’s always great when students get so engaged in the class that they want more information). So, I did a little digging and here’s what I came up with:

The average wait time in the US to see a doctor in the emergency room has risen to about an hour in 2008, per this article. That is an increase from 2004, when it hit around 38 minutes (Wilper 2008). However, the total amount of time someone spends in the ER (both waiting and then after you see a doctor) is now up to 4 hours in the US (see this article).

Now, for the numbers on Canadian care… Of the patients who are most acute when they arrive in an emergency room in Canada, 50% are seen within 6 minutes and 86% are seen within 30 minutes. Only 1 in 10 waited three hours or more, per this report.

Comparing the numbers for the US to the numbers for Canada aren’t really accurate.  The data in the US is for all emergency room visitors (both acute and not acute) while the data for Canada is primarily for the most acute. I’m guessing that the average wait time to see a doctor is actually probably pretty similar, though maybe slightly shorter in Canada. Also, overall visit time in the emergency department in at least one region in Canada is about half of that in the US (per this report; see page 7).   So, average wait time to see a doctor in the ER is probably a bit shorter in Canada, but not by much.  Additionally, Germany, which also has a single payer healthcare system, has shorter wait times then either Canada or the US (per this article, which is in German but with an English abstract).

For non-emergency surgeries, both elective and non-elective, Canadians do wait longer (see this article, Barton et. al. 2000,  and Ho 2000).  Basically, wait times for non-elective surgeries in Canada are slightly longer than in the US, but not by a huge amount. And those slightly longer wait times do not translate into worse outcomes (Ho 2000).

The question my student followed up with was: How could differences in payment systems affect wait times?

This is actually a great question.  Here’s the answer per Wilper (2008): They don’t directly, but they do indirectly. When you have as many people in the US as we do who do not have health insurance (about 17% of our population), those people end up “clogging” the emergency rooms. They don’t get elective care, like people in Canada do. Instead, when they get sick, they go to emergency rooms. And since almost 1/5 of our population is doing that, that substantially increases the wait times in emergency rooms. So, indirectly, the lack of insurance coverage in the US translates into higher emergency room wait times.

The Canadian government has been criticized for the lengthy wait times, which is why they have examined this issue. For a detailed report, see here.

Since I don’t write about health care normally, I figured I’d just go ahead and post this up here.  I couldn’t find an article that compared wait times directly.  If anyone has one, I’d love a copy.

References:

Barton H. Hamilton, Dana P. Goldman, and Vivian Ho. “Queuing for Surgery: Is the U.S. or Canada Worse Off?” The Review of Economics and Statistics 82.2 (2000): 297-308.

I should really be doing other work, but after reading the news this morning, it dawned on me that what I really wanted to do was write a short blog post about “The True Meaning of Christmas.”  (NOTE: For all the readers of my blog who are religious, this is your cue to stop reading now if you don’t want to hear me discuss the historical origins of Christmas.)

While other people have put similar ideas on paper before, I wanted something I could refer back to easily for future reference.  I also wanted to extend those ideas slightly.  So, I give you my version of the True Meaning of Christmas:

1) In pre-history, December 25th didn’t actually exist as a date, that had to await the invention of the Gregorian calendar.  Calendars were, of course, under development, but none of them had a pre-specified date for the birth of the mythical figure Jesus.

2) By roughly 4,000 BCE pre-historic astronomers and astronomers in early Egypt developed calendars, noting that the shortest day of the year (in terms of amount of sunlight in the Northern Hemisphere) is close to December 25th (actually Dec. 21st).  Their calendars obviously don’t include a month called December.

3) ~648-330 BCE - Using the Egyptian calendar and basing some of their beliefs on those of the Egyptians, the Persians developed a belief in a sun god named Mithras, whose birthday fell on or around the date we would now recognize to be about December 25th.

4) ~100 BCE to ~300 CE - Romans celebrate a winter festival called Saturnalia, which celebrates the opening of the temple of Saturn.  The festival starts out as a 1 day affair on December 17th, but eventually turns into a week-long affair, running through December 23th.  The festival is marked by giving gifts, feasts, and parties.

5) 274 CE - A new Roman festival is introduced called “Dies Natalis Solis Invicti,” which is basically Latin for the “birthday of the unconquered sun god.”  Solis Invictus was the name of the sun god and a celebration was held in his honor on December 25th, decades before Christians began celebrating Christmas.

6) ~200-400 CE (estimated dates; probably range much wider) - Prior to their Christianization, Germans and Scandinavians practiced polytheism (a.k.a. they were pagans).  One of their celebrations, possibly influenced by Roman celebrations, was the festival of Yule, which took place around December 25th (exact dates aren’t clear).  The festival included sacrificing animals, burning yule logs, singing yule songs, and decorating with evergreen boughs.  Other than decorating their temples and the men with the blood of the animals sacrificed, many of the traditions from Yule celebrations have been incorporated into modern Christmas celebrations (Too bad about that blood decorating thing…  I’m sensing a new holiday tradition here!).  Yule is also the root of the word “jolly.”

7)354 CE  - Historical records make first mention of Christians celebrating Christmas as a festival, probably near December 25th and overlapping with other Roman festivities.

8) During the 1200s CE, Christians began incorporating elements of the Roman festival Saturnalia into their new holiday, Christmas.  The festival of Saturnalia becomes the 12 Days of Christmas.

9) During the 1500s a character is introduced into Christmas celebrations named Father Christmas.  He serves a variety of roles, but he is generally just seen as a jovial old drunk guy.

10) In the 17th Century Protestants are disturbed by the raucous nature of Christmas celebrations (which are still similar to Yule and Saturnalia).  They ban all Christmas celebrations.  This includes Puritans in the US and religious groups in the UK.  Roman Catholics respond by trying to make Christmas celebrations more religious.  The bans are relatively short-lived.

11) Christmas undergoes little development until the middle of the 19th Century when popular authors like Charles Dickens, Washington Irving, and Clement Clarke Moore write about Christmas.  In their stories they invent many of the traditions and meanings that are now associated with Christmas - stockings, Santa Claus, family dinners, Christmas trees, gifts, etc.

12) The creation of the new traditions by 19th Century authors also begins the commercialization of the holiday, which is quickly embraced by the rapidly developing consumerist culture of the United States.  Corporations latch on to the idea of an end of the year spending spree, which is beneficial for their bottom line.  Smartly, they wrap this in altruism - it’s always good to give, right?

13) Also created in the middle of the 19th Century is the modern-day conception of Santa Claus, who was drawn by cartoonist Thomas Nast.  The idea is rooted in various European traditions of a gift giver, which is probably rooted in older traditions, perhaps representing the mythical magi who gave gifts to the infant Jesus and other Persian and Roman myths.

14) Christmas became a federal holiday in the U.S. in 1870.  It wasn’t until the late 20th Century, however, that religious fundamentalists in the U.S. began to decontextualize Christmas and turn it into a part of their culture war.  “Decontextualize” means they removed the context of the holiday.  The context is everything outlined above - the fact that it is based on various other holidays stolen or co-opted from other religious groups.  Once you remove the context of something you get to assert that it has only one meaning - a celebration of the birth of Jesus.  This is actually a very clever ploy by religious fundamentalists and political pundits to monopolize the meaning of a term and then use it against moderate Christians in their culture war.  It makes moderately religious people feel guilty.  My thought here is that religious fundamentalists want to use this to attract more moderate thinkers to their way of thinking, building their armies of followers.

15) Several years ago a group of atheists, agnostics, and humanists decided they didn’t like the consumerism associated with Christmas.  They also decided they didn’t like the religious themes now attached to Christmas. They created a new holiday that falls between the Winter Solstice and December 25th called Human Light Day. It is a celebration of humanity.  Some give gifts; some decorate in ways very similar to Christmas.  Some sing songs.  It’s basically a secular version of Christmas.  In a sense, December 25th has come full circle - it started out as just another day, became an important date for a bunch of mythological deities, and has now been returned to just another day.

16) So, do you want to know the true meaning of Christmas?  It can be summarized in one word: “syncretism.”  Syncretism is the combining, adoption, or co-opting of beliefs of one group by a new group.  Religious history is full of syncretism.  For instance, when Roman Catholicism came to the Americas, particularly Latin America, they forced the Native Americans to convert to Roman Catholicism.  As part of this process, many of the Native Americans carried their old religious views into their new religion.  At the same time, Roman Catholicism, learning from its thousands of years of forcing conversion of other groups, realized it is easier to co-opt the beliefs of a group than destroy them.  To facilitate this, Roman Catholics built churches over Native American temples, overlayed Native American gods onto saints, and co-opted holidays, like Dia de los Muertos.  As a result, Roman Catholicism in Latin America is quite different from Roman Catholicism in Europe, the US, etc.  It is a syncretism between Native American religions and European Roman Catholicism.

Syncretism is the key to understanding Christmas.  Christmas did not just pop out of thin air the day Jesus was born.  No one knows if Jesus actually lived and no one knows when this mythical character was born.  So, the holiday couldn’t just spring up to celebrate Jesus’s birthday given all the unknowns.  Also, the evidence suggesting Christians slowly pieced together a holiday out of prior religious festivals is quite compelling.  You can thank Scandinavian and Germanic pagans for: yule logs, Christmas songs, Christmas trees, and Santa Claus.  You can thank pagan Romans for gift giving, feasts, and parties.  And you can thank 19th Century authors and profit seeking corporations for: Santa Claus, gift giving, modern decorations, and the rampant consumerism of the season.

Now, for my contribution.  Given the fact that Christmas has been constructed, reconstructed, and even deconstructed by various groups over the years, that means the meaning of the holiday is fluid.  The claims of religious fundamentalists and political pundits trying to boost their ratings aside, the true meaning of Christmas is not the birth of the mythical Jesus.  The true meaning of Christmas is whatever you want it to be; religious, secular, whatever.  It’s your life; you get to give it whatever meaning you want.  No one has a monopoly on what Christmas can or does mean.  Yes, the word historically refers to “Christ’s Mass,” but there is no reason it has to in your own mind.  After all, how many Christians associate “Yule” with Odin?  You can turn Christmas into a purely secular holiday that includes no thought of the mythical Jesus, or Mithras, or Odin, or Solis Invictus, or any other god whose birthday has been celebrated on that day.

I think the true meaning of Christmas should be more akin to that created by secular humanists: A day to remember that we are all humans, to celebrate our relationships, both immediate and distant, and to reflect on our common goal to see our species survive.  That, to me, is what any holiday should mean.  But, the beauty of understanding that a holiday’s meaning is fluid is that you get to decide for you.  Yeah, you probably won’t hear me wishing people Merry Christmas any time soon, but I hope you do have a happy holiday season, whatever that means to you.

Here’s the complete history of Christmas in a single chart:

I created the chart in Powerpoint (1 and 2).